Unwinnable Afghan War

The POST, Sun, Oct,12, 2008.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema

In January 2003, this scribe wrote an article questioning the possibility of victory in Afghan war. Many factors impeding progress in the war were highlighted but as usual no serious considerations were paid. After the passage of five and half years, not only the field commanders engaged in war against terrorism in Afghanistan but also many others including those linked with the UN are now reaching the same conclusion which this scribe had written in Jan.2003 and are encouraging negotiations with Taliban.

Reportedly Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith after serving in Afghanistan stressed recently that foreign forces would not be able to deliver a decisive victory. At best they might be able to reduce the Taliban struggle to a manageable level which is not viewed as a great strategic threat and could be easily managed by the newly trained Afghan army. The Brigadier was of the view that regular troops rarely loose battles against guerillas but this does not mean that they would meet successes either.

His conclusion seemed to revolve around the notion that if the Afghan war cannot be won decisively then it should end in a negotiated peace settlement which is acceptable to both sides. He argued that neither side can win this war as both sides are evenly balanced. Besides, the Americans had allied themselves with the Northern alliance with a view to oust Taliban from power and in the process the largest faction of the Afghan society was somewhat alienated.

Not only it is a well known fact that traditionally the Pakhtoons had been the dominant faction of the Afghan society but they have been also in power for ages. Their ouster from power with the help of other factions like Tajiks and Hazaras has only further divided the Afghans. The east and south of Afghanistan is dominated by the Taliban who are mostly Pakhtoons.

Just as the foreign forces are unable to establish firm control over Taliban areas, the Taliban have not been able to maintain any reasonable level of control over the northern areas even when they ruled in Kabul in 1996-2001. Many analysts are of the view that foreign forces are fighting Paktoon nationalism in areas that are controlled by the Taliban.

Given the existing stalemate, perhaps the only viable option appears to be a negotiated settlement. Undoubtedly the negotiated settlement must give fair share of power to the Pakhtoon faction of the Afghan society. Almost all reports published in various parts of the world clearly reveal that this is still seen as unthinkable in most western capitals. But on the other hand without the participation of Taliban, it is equally unthinkable that peace will come to Afghanistan.

Cognizant of the emerging realities, reports are currently indicating that even the President Karazai has now become convinced that the stability of Afghanistan is indeed linked with the participation of Taliban in a negotiated peace settlement. It has also been reported that Karazai has sought the help of Saudi Arabia in this regard and some kind contact is being made with Taliban. What would be the outcome these talks remain to be seen but there is no doubt the negotiation path is probably a step in the right direction.

Admittedly the presence of large number of foreign forces can maintain a certain amount of stability in parts of Afghanistan, while in other parts the Taliban can do the job. But the main question revolves around whether or not Taliban would agree to the presence NATO/ ISAF forces in Afghanistan. The departure of foreign forces could most likely accelerate the collapse of Karazai regime.

If the current stalemate continues, then the question that would be haunting the west would be that how long they would maintain their forces in Afghanistan. According to Brigadier Carleton-Smith if the west reduces its expectations, then they can hand over tactical responsibility to the Afghan army in three to five years followed by the transfer of bulk of the responsibility for combating insurgency in the next ten years. By this timetable, one should expect the presence of foreign forces during the next ten to fifteen years.

While the reports are indicating that Taliban have suffered serious reverses but they have come back with renewed vigor. The inability of the incumbent Afghan regime to check corruption, control drug trafficking, provide security and stability beyond Kabul, accelerate the training process of trained policemen as well as the army, maintain law and order in areas under their control, accelerate developmental programs, build institutions and inject confidence among the people have contributed toward a vast scale alienation of the people.

Confronted with chaotic situation, the Afghan people move towards places that have demonstrated some semblance of stability. The outcome is that some people move to Karazai controlled areas while the other go to Taliban controlled areas. A vast tract of land is still controlled by the local warlords. In short despite the injection of large monetary doses, the situation in Afghanistan has not really demonstrated a noticeable improvement.

The panacea of Afghan troubles lies in the concerted efforts of all concerned. This implies that not only the directly involved countries should cooperate and collaborate their efforts but the regional countries may also be brought into the collective efforts in order to find a workable solution of the Afghan problem.

Given the past history and the existing situation the ongoing war by itself may not be able to produce a clear winner; concerted efforts for a negotiated settlement may be able to pay the desired dividends. But one has to ensure that the all the stake holders are treated at par and given the fair share. The increasing noises that war is unlikely to produce the desired dividends merely reflects that the thinking is now becoming lot more realistic than what was the case in the past.

The writer works for Islamabad Policy research Institute.