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Threatening to invade Pakistan
The POST,
Sun, Jun,22, 2008.
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema
It certainly appears amusing that a President who cannot inject a semblance of
stability in his own country and is heavily dependent upon external actors for
country’s as well as his personal security is threatening a bigger neighbor to
invade. It is a foregone conclusion that President Karazai could not have
contemplated such a step unless he is encouraged by an external actor or
actors.
President Karazai specifically threatened warlords Baitullah Masood, Maulvi
Umar and Maulana Fazalullah for whom he said he will send troops across
border. What he appeared to have forgotten or deliberately ignored that such a
statement would not only send the wrong signals but it involves deliberate
violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. If President Karazai expects that the
Pakistanis would keep quiet after such a provocative statement, then he must
be living in a fool’s paradise.
The immediate reactions of the Pakistanis manifested in varied forms. First,
the government of Pakistan lodged a strong protest. The Afghan ambassador was
summoned to foreign office and a strong protest note was handed over to him.
Second, the elected representatives expressed their anger in many forms.
Third, the Prime Minster stated in no uncertain terms that Pakistan will not
allow any external ingress into Pakistani territory. The foreign minister in a
separate statement made it absolutely clear that Pakistan shall defend its
territorial sovereignty. Fourth, the general public expressed their anger both
in serious and light moulds. Fifth, the insurgent expressed their strengthened
determination to carry on their fight rather than being cowed down. In fact it
has earned them some popularity unnecessarily.
While the statement is pregnant with so many implications, three aspects need
to be highlighted here. First, the statement reflects the level of distrust
the Afghan government
is currently entertaining. It seems that Afghan government is convinced that
the government of Pakistan is either not doing enough or is incapable to
control the militants in the tribal areas and therefore Afghan troops should
to do the job. It also implies that what Pakistanis have been unable to do;
the Afghan troops would be able to do it successfully.
Linked with it is the assumption that the Pakistanis are deliberately not
performing their role satisfactorily. In a way it could be an effort to lend
credibility to American journalistic assertions that Pakistan is not doing
enough and it should do more. An objective analysis of Pakistani efforts lends
more credence to a totally different interpretation which stresses that
Pakistan has contributed much more in the war against terrorism than any other
coalition partner.
Second, such a statement heralds the revival of blame game. Although the
notion of blame game had not totally evaporated or disappeared from the scene,
the intensity of its regularity certainly appeared to be on the decline.
However a statement of this kind tends to not just revive it but also injects
seeds of action reaction-phenomenon and increases its frequency. Blame game
has never been able to improve the situation. On the contrary it has always
injected unnecessary complications.
Third, given the state of affairs in Afghanistan and incumbent government’s
inability to deal effectively with Taliban insurgency along with extending
government’s writ to large parts of Afghanistan, it seems ludicrous to even
think of attacking a much stronger neighbor. So the thought of external
actor’s involvement becomes a real possibility. Who could be the external
actor?
The external actors can play both positive and negative roles depending on
their well thought policy objectives. Given the regional situation and the
state of war in Afghanistan along with complex nature of the tribal area, one
can easily identify three main external actors; the Americans, the Indians and
the Afghan incumbent government with a special focus on their pursued
objectives can be looked as main external actors. The SCO (especially China,
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan), Iran, and Russia can also be viewed as minor
actors.
Judged by any yardstick the record of the American role as an external actor
appears to be somewhat mixed one; a mixture of positive and negative
approaches. The Indian role in the area has been mostly negative. It is a
common knowledge the Afghan government is actively cooperating with the Indian
intelligence agencies through Afghan intelligence agencies, Ministry of
Interior, and the Ministry of Borders and Tribal Affairs in launching covert
activities against Pakistan areas. The role of NATO has been less significant.
Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan has always been somewhat problematic
despite the existence of a realization that both need to have very cordial
relationships. While Pakistan’s major objective is to have a friendly and
stable Afghanistan on its western borders, it appears that the developments in
Afghanistan have invariably influenced the Afghan decision makers to employ
the strategy of shifting responsibilities in one form or the other. Pakistan
is fully conscious of the fact that instability in Afghanistan would have
direct and serious repercussions for Pakistan; therefore all of its efforts
are directed towards the stability, unity, development and prosperity of
Afghanistan.
There is no doubt that the panacea of Afghan troubles revolves around what can
be termed as ‘cooperative and friendly relations between Afghanistan and
Pakistan’. To put the blame for its own internal troubles on the good
intentioned Pakistanis had only strengthened the hands of those who do not
want to see the advent of stable and a friendly Afghanistan. The Afghan
government should not forget how Pakistan has always been deeply interested in
Afghans welfare and has consistently extended its full cooperation-even
accommodated and still continues to accommodate millions of Afghan refugees.
President Karazai’s irresponsible utterance in fact flabbergasted everyone in
Pakistan though everybody recognizes that Afghan President could not have
given such a statement without the expressed backing of an external actor.
However one expects that the Afghan President would not jeopardized the long
term Afghan interest in order to gain a short term favor from its external
supporter.
The writer works for Islamabad Policy research Institute.
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