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To Bonn With Hope Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema Following the swift retreat of the Talibans from large portions of Afghanistan, which they controlled, the efforts of the international community were quickly focused on the most important question of how to rebuild a totally shattered nation and completely destroyed country. To begin with it is imperative to have some form of provisional government installed in the capital as soon as possible. But even to secure the establishment of a provisional government, one has to work out an agreement among the different warring factions. The task becomes even more complex when one is confronted with the acute demographic diversity of Afghanistan. While the fall of Kabul does not necessarily imply that the war in Afghanistan is over as the Talibans are claiming to have consolidated their position in some of the southern provinces of Afghanistan, the UN accelerated its efforts to secure some rudimentary form of consensus in order to have at least some semblance of government in Afghanistan. The first step the UN's special representative on Afghanistan has taken is to secure the consent of some of the Afghan factions to meet in Bonn on Monday. Reports are indicating that only four major factions would attend the Bonn
moot. The Northern Alliance consists of many ethnic groups such as the Tajiks, the Hazaras, and the Uzbeks etc. What is probably not very clear at this stage is whether or not the Northern Alliance would be represented in its collective capacity or each of the component part would participate in their individual capacity. Apprehensions regarding the existence of dissension among the higher ranks of the Northern Alliance have already been expressed. Reports coming out of Afghanistan are also generating the impression that the Hazaras would like to send their own delegation. The second invited group consists of designated representatives of the former king Zahir Shah. There is no doubt that the King still commands limited amount of respect among some of the Afghans factions but he has been away from Afghanistan for a long time. Not only the ravages of internal fighting have devastated the country but the existing divisions of Afghan society along with their assertive tribal identifications have also been further sharpened. Besides, Rabbani's expressed assertion that former King would only be welcomed if he comes to Afghanistan, as an ordinary citizen does not bode well for intended discussions at Bonn. The third group that has been invited to Bonn moot is the Afghan Diaspora. Most of the members of Afghan Diaspora who left Afghanistan are in the earliest waves of migrations are either monarchist or those who were enjoying considerable privileges in Afghanistan. Later migrants were indeed from the poorer class. There were five waves of Afghan refugees. The first group left Afghanistan after the abolition of monarchy in 1973. These were mostly monarchists who were soon able to adjust in societies they opted to live in. The second wave of Afghan refugees consisted of those who intensely disliked communism and left the country after the Saur revolution in 1978. The third wave of Afghan refugees started with the introduction of radical reforms during the early period of communist regime-more specifically the reforms that were enforced by Hafiz Ullah Amin. The fourth wave of refugee was caused by the war against the Soviets. Since the life in Afghanistan was totally disrupted, a large number of refugees left Afghanistan and took refuge in both Pakistan and Iran. The final wave of the Afghan refugees was the product of Afghan civil war. The last group of Afghans that has been invited to Bonn consists of some Afghan commanders and former resistance leaders who recently met in Peshawar convention. This group is largely Pakhtoon. However this group mostly consists of leaders who were unable to work out a feasible system soon after the withdrawal of the Soviets. It includes many commanders, tribal and factional leaders. But it is also said that they all enjoy limited influence and control over the Afghan Pakhtoons. The situation is no longer similar to one that was frequently witnessed immediately following the Soviet withdrawal. It needs to be pointed out that nobody from the Taliban group has been invited. It is not too difficult to understand that Talibans are viewed as a defeated party and defeated groups rarely get similar treatment but ignoring entirely the Talibans amounts to not extending deserving representation to the Afghan Pakhtoons. Indeed one can make out a case for excluding the Talibans but not all the Pakhtoons are Talibans. Some mechanism needs to be considered for giving due representation to the Pakhtoons. The figures issued by various agencies regarding the demographic shades of the Afghan society often differ with each other but one cannot deny the fact that the Pakhtoons constitute the largest group of the Afghan people. Given the state of anarchy that prevails in Afghanistan today and somewhat demonstrated conqueror's behaviour of the Tajik leaders of the Northern Alliance, it is not too far fetched to assume that the Bonn moot will certainly test the diplomatic skills of the organizers. Each of the participants is likely to jealously guard their interests. Yet the situation requires that a provisional government be put in place as soon as possible. While one can think of many intricate problems that are likely to confront the participants of the Bonn moot, two deserve to be highlighted here. The first deals with the establishment of an international peace keeping force and second focuses on the next head of the Afghan provisional government. It is not too far fetched to assume that all the Afghan forces not only lack the requisite level of discipline but also have frequently demonstrated their tribal characteristics in their confrontations against each other. If only the forces of Northern Alliance are stationed in Kabul, then the other groups may disapprove such a move. On the other hand if outsiders are employed to maintain law and order in Kabul and also keep a check on various Afghan groups eruptive tendencies, the question that would tax our mind is whether the Northern Alliance would agree to such a proposal. Equally taxing problem would be the nature and composition of the provisional government especially who is going to be the head of government. Ordinarily one would think that the leader of the victorious faction would be assigned such a role but in this case it is same leader who is deemed to be responsible for the Afghan civil war. Had Rabbani faithfully carried out the provisions of Peshawar Accord, the Afghans could have been spared of internal infighting. The other candidate, the King, appears to be equally an unattractive choice. The King remained somewhat unconcerned with the plight of the Afghans for more than two decades. Perhaps the best way out is to opt for a weak central government and strong regional centers. For administrative purposes the country could be divided into five or six regions in accordance with the ethnic composition of the country. Most of the administrative powers should be delegated to the regional authorities. Generally the center could play a coordinator's role but in the event of serious disagreement it could act as an arbiter. If such a framework is envisaged then at the central level there could be a council of regional representatives who can elect their own president or the head of the provisional government. The permanent political framework should indeed be left to the Afghan Loya Jirga. The Bonn moot must produce some form of a compromised formula in order to inject sanity and stability in Afghanistan and to begin to end the sufferings of the Afghan people. Far too long the Afghans have been subjected to unnecessary sufferings. It is time to reverse the trend. Perhaps that's why the world is anxiously and hopefully looking towards Bonn for the much desired peace panacea for Afghanistan.
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