The US and Indo-Pak Relations

The POST, Sun, Mar,05, 2006.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema


Much has been made out of the impending South Asian visit of the President Bush. A plethora of articles expressing expectations and concerns have appeared in the print media. It is not unusual to see so many opinions articulately expressed on both electronic and print media of Pakistan particularly when a president of the most powerful nation undertakes goodwill journey to various parts of the world. Not only it provides an opportunity to express concerns and apprehensions but also an occasion to highlight constructive ideas regarding what needs to be done and what has been ignored in the past.

The presence of a super power in any particular region is the product of dynamics of international developments. It could be viewed both with satisfaction if it supports the target country or it provides opportunity to generates apprehension if it is opting a course of action other than the desired one. Almost all significant developments at the international scene tend to influence smaller nations to adjust their policy pursuit to the emerging realities.

During the Cold War era a regional state's sense of insecurity introduced an outsider into the region which in turn was misinterpreted by its adversary as an attempt to tilt the incumbent power equilibrium to its own favor and thus causing the introduction of an outsider equalizer. Pakistan's acute sense of insecurity and helplessness that was primarily caused by colonial legacies compelled her to join the western sponsored alliance system which India interpreted as her attempt to upset the existing natural power hierarchy in the region. Consequently India introduced the Soviet Union into the region, thus making the regions as part of the ongoing cold war struggle.

The involvement of both the Americans and the Soviets was indeed the product of their global policies. Consequently the shift in their global policy pursuits were reflected in their South Asian policies. While most of their policy shifts were in congruence with their changing global policies, the modifications introduced in their regional policies to suit global pursuits appeared to the regional states somewhat incomprehensible. For local states the great powers regional policy was far more important than their global pursuits. Consequently changes in regional policies caused uneasiness among the regional states.

India-Pakistan relations have been inextricably linked with superpowers relations. While it is true to say that the initial superpowers entanglements were derivative of the Cold War commitments, the later deepening of involvement was the product of partly the local dynamics and partly of the readjustment of their mutual relationships. The Americans went into the area with the objective of containing the then perceived marching communism and checking the Soviet adventurism. Similarly the Soviet accepted the invitation to participate in South Asian tangle primarily to check the increasing influence of the Americans and to prevent the American efforts to deny the area to them. Both the Pakistanis and the Indians sought the assistance and association with chosen superpower in order to balance out the perceived imbalance of power, and to tilt the balance in its favor if it was possible.

In 1962 the adversarial nature of US Soviet relations changed, because of exposure of India's inability to withstand the Chinese march. Both began to strengthen India's defense capability against China which in turn, led to a Sino Pakistan entente cordial. Realizing that building India's defense capability is likely to push Pakistan too much towards China, the Soviets put out the usual carrot towards Pakistan. But waving of carrot toward Pakistan's direction invited the wrath of India. Confronted with the dilemma how to continue strengthening their relations with India and not to annoy Pakistan too much, the Soviets were more or less drifting towards the same policy which the Americans had pursued, how to help Pakistan and simultaneously not annoying India too much, and evolved their own solution in the form of Asian Security Plan. The Pakistanis comprehended its anti Chinese orientation and refused participation. At that stage the American pursuit of rapprochement with China pushed the Soviets to go all out for India.

Pakistan's disillusionment of American reliability had reached its crescendo in the 1971 war and with change in government Pakistan officially adopted the policy of bilateralism and tried to improve its relations with the Soviets. During the first half of the 70s, the American influence in the area was at the lowest ebb whereas the Soviets influence rapidly increased. In the 80s the American reestablished their relation with Pakistan only after the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan.

Whenever the US Soviet relations have been antagonistic and both sides have tried to strengthen their allies in the region, the relations between local states have also been overtly adversarial. When the US Soviets were promoting detente and tacitly collaborating with each other, the Soviets tended to capitalize over the situation and managed to increase their influence (1965 War and its aftermath, and 1979 the invasion of Afghanistan).

When the Americans accepted Pakistan's participation in the alliance system and decided to send military hardware to Pakistan, they were simultaneously trying to appease and win over India as well. Obviously they could not properly comprehend the intensity of the operative hostility between India and Pakistan. A higher level of US military commitment to Pakistan would satisfy the Pakistanis but would annoy the Indians. A lower level of American commitment to Pakistan would not satisfy the Pakistanis but would be acceptable to the Indians.

After the departure of the Cold War, not only the international situation was radically transformed but the US interests in the region underwent substantive changes. The compelling need to match the cold war adversary’s pursuits in various regions totally disappeared. In the post cold war era American interests in the region included promoting democracy and economic liberalization, curbing opium cultivation and checking narcotic trafficking, encouraging nuclear restraints, safeguarding human rights and providing humanitarian relief.

Following the nuclear explosions of May 1998, the American interest began to revolve around the renewed American efforts to discourage, as far as possible, the India Pakistan rivalry, and to promote peace and stability in the area. Since then it has been actively demonstrating its interests to resolve Indo Pak dispute by offering its good offices. It has also been engaged in encouraging more American investments in the region in order to establish a reasonable level of economic relationship independent of aid relationship. The cultivation of strong economic linkages is likely to provide influence leverage to US.

One basic problem that confronted the Americans in the past was the lack of influence leverage with regard to India which was partly caused by Indo-Soviet ties and partly American security and economic assistance relationship with Pakistan. With the increasing American investments in India and gradual strengthening of its trading and nuclear linkage, Americans are not only gaining ground in India but they are also specifically highlighting separate nature US-Pakistan relationships.

At one stage the most important concern of the Americans in the region was to secure a nuclear free South Asia. In this connection both India and Pakistan were subjected to intense pressures to abandon their quest to become nuclear powers. But both India and Pakistan had advanced articulate and convincing arguments to retain their nuclear programs. Unable to prevent the nuclearization of South Asia, the American intensified their efforts to erode the real source of tension between India and Pakistan in order to enable the passage of their policies a smooth passage. Hence the increased interest in the ongoing Kashmir dispute.

Following the tragedy of 9/11, the American efforts were concentrated upon combating international terrorism which resulted into America’s war against Afghanistan and its Taliban regime. Both India and Pakistan joined international coalition against terrorism but their relations did not register any upward surge. It was only after the beginning of the incumbent peace process, things began to improve. While the ongoing peace process is primarily the product of increased indigenous realization that military approaches are unlikely to resolve the disputes and pay the desired dividends, the American contributions in preventing drift towards clashes is indeed well recognized. The recent assertion by President Bush that he would try to facilitate the resolution of Kashmir dispute is a welcome development but not many in the region believe that he would be able to radically influence the Indian mindset on Kashmir.

The writer works for Islamabad Policy research Institute.