Risk reduction agreement

The POST, Sun, March,04, 2007.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema

The signing of a five year extendable agreement to reduce the risk of accidents of nuclear weapons or other related aspects is indeed a good omen. The agreement calls upon both parties to maintain and improve national, organizational and technical arrangements to guard against accidents relating to nuclear weapons, to notify each other immediately in the wake of any accidents relating to nuclear weapons with potential radioactive fallout or the risk of a nuclear war.

Despite the tragic bombing of Samjhota Express, the finalization of an agreement of this nature indeed reflects the maturity and determination of the leaders of India and Pakistan. Pakistan is pretty well known for its continuous efforts aimed to inject restraints soon after both India and Pakistan had become nuclear weapons states. In fact prior to the nuclearisation of South Asia, Pakistan tried very hard to prevent the advent of nuclear weapons in South Asia but failed miserably partly because of Indian determination to acquire nuclear weapons and partly because of lack of interest demonstrated by the International Community.

 In fact Pakistan floated many proposals suggesting the creation of nuclear free zone, mutual acceptance of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards, simultaneous signing of the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty), joint declaration to renounce development of nuclear weapons, bilateral facilities to inspect each others nuclear facilities, and signing of regional test ban treaty but non of these proposals elicited positive response from the Indians.

It needs to be stressed here that the international community did not demonstrate any real enthusiasm to prevent the nuclearization of South Asia. More pressures were applied to Pakistan to abandon its quest to acquire nuclear weapons despite the fact that Pakistan had repeatedly asserted that it would immediately sign the NPT provided India also does the same. Logical course of action entails that the members of international community should have applied more pressures against India but they did not. Instead they decided to apply more pressures upon Pakistan in order to secure an announcement by the Pakistani authorities that they would sign NPT. The logic that was advanced at the time was that once Pakistan signs NPT, they would be able to secure Indian signature quite easily.

Once both India and Pakistan acquired the requisite nuclear weapon capability in May 1998 by conducting the necessary tests, the immediate reaction of the international community was to punish both countries and consequently sanctions were imposed on both countries only to be lifted later. Currently the Americans have signed what they like to call civil nuclear deal with India stressing that India will subject its 16 civilian nuclear establishments under the safeguards of IAEA but does not say anything about the 8 military related nuclear related establishments.

To an outsider it appears that on one hand the international community refused to recognize openly that India is a nuclear weapon state and on the other hand it makes a clear distinction and implicitly recognizes the fact that India has civilian nuclear establishments as well as military nuclear establishments. A leading American official even asserted that they will never recognize India as a nuclear weapons state but agreed to the above mentioned distinction. In addition the US is also committed to influence the NSG members to supply nuclear related material to India for its use in civilian nuclear establishments.

Strange though it may seem that during the Cold War the US even stopped supplies to Tarapura reactor but encourages another country to help India out. Now they have decided to supply to India the requisite nuclear material under the safeguards of IAEA directly. The changed US policy towards India reflects many contradiction. India is not a member of NPT yet the nuclear material is going to supplied to it. The US accused so many countries of nuclear commerce but the deal is aimed to allows nuclear commerce to a non-NPT country. Frequently the US referred its inability to adhere to points of view quoting its own laws. The deal violates many of US laws yet the American Lawmakers deemed fit in their wisdom to allow the violation in order to support the agreement with a non-NPT.

The obvious interpretations of such arguments are three. First, international community and more specifically US is determined to build and help its Asian strategic partner. Second, they fully comprehend the implications involved but are acutely conscious of the limited nature of their influence over India and therefore they are willing to make room for Indian even if it costs their own credibility or violation of their own laws. Third, they were never genuinely interested to secure Indian signature upon the NPT as they knew it well that India will never go along with them under the then existing conditions. However they were not willing to make similar concessions for other interested countries. For a Pakistani it has become quite clear that they were more interested to deprive Pakistan of its then likely nuclear assets whereas they were inclined to accept India as a nuclear weapons state.

Compared to the contradictory stances that has been demonstrated by the most powerful nation and some of its other allies, the Indian and the Pakistani have demonstrated a much more rational attitude. The signing of risk reduction agreement clearly reflects the desire of the two countries how to make their nuclear assets and the area safer. It is obvious the two countries will further improve and increase their communication network in order to facilitate timely warning and if unfortunate developments are timely reported the chances of minimizing the expected damages would obviously brighten.

As it was stated above that the two countries are moving on the right path. The ongoing peace process would certainly get the much needed boost despite the unfortunate Samjhota Express tragedy. Such cooperative measures would not only make South Asia a safe area but would inject further confidence among the two parties. However this does not mean that this agreement covers everything. More needed to done in this regard.

It needs to be stressed here that the advent of real peace and security in South Asia is indeed hostage to the ongoing Kashmir dispute. While it is generally acknowledged that overall atmospherics have considerably improved and things seemed to be moving at a as some would say steady pace and while other refer to it as somewhat slow. Undoubtedly this is the time that the two sides should make concerted efforts to remove the major hurdle on way to regional peace and harmony.

All agreements, however small and peripheral they may be, tends to generate positive vibes. It is hoped that in this fourth round of composite dialogue the two sides would be able to resolve other disputes. The efforts should be directed to make the year 2007 as the year of resolution of all disputes. To improve the quality of life for ordinary people, it is generally agreed that peace is an essential ingredient.

The writer works for Islamabad Policy research Institute.