Rewarding a proliferator

Pakistan OBSERVER, Tue, Aug,07, 2007.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema

The India-US nuclear agreement was signed in March 2006 in New Delhi, following President Bush’s visit to India. After hard lobbying and debate, the bill was overwhelmingly passed by the US Congress and has become a law on December 23, 2006. This is by amending section 123 of US Atomic Energy Act of 1954.  It is termed as an historic and unique agreement with a unique country. It reverses the US policy towards India that lasted till July 2005. The US opposed nuclear cooperation with India for developing nuclear weapons in contravention of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but in July 2005 it decided to reward a proliferator. 

Under the US-India Nuclear deal, India will be given access to civilian nuclear technology in return for placing its 16 civilian atomic reactors under global safeguards. The US has rationalized the passage of the Act by terming it as a ‘stand alone’ agreement. An important State Department official, who played a key role in negotiations observed that, “unlike some of their neighbors, the Indians, have been very responsible” and “have protected their nuclear technology.” It needs to be mentioned here that it was India that caused nuclear weapon proliferation in South Asia. Not only Pakistan had repeatedly offered to sign the NPT if the international community is able to convince India to do the same. The Americans justified the deal on the grounds of India’s special needs of energy. Indeed it was a US “exemption” and an exception to the laws for India,” despite the fact that it is a major contributor to global warming and air pollution. Yet India has been made special case and perhaps that is why President Carter referred to it as a dangerous deal. 

The rationale for the deal was India’s growing energy problems. It would not be out of order to mention that Pakistan also faces similar energy dilemma but the US is unwilling to consider helping Pakistan in this regard on the same lines as was proposed for India. Compared to Pakistan, Washington considers India a responsible nuclear power as it had not indulged in nuclear commerce. Despite the fact it has been internationally recognized that the State of Pakistan was not involved or even knew about A.Q. Khan’s activities with regard to nuclear commerce, the US was not at all sympathetic to Pakistani request. 

Despite the fact that A.Q.Khan did not break any of Pakistan’s international legal obligations, the government of Pakistan awarded not only harsh penalty to A.Q.Khan but also passed legislation making nuclear commerce a punishable offence. However the West tried to pressurize Pakistan in order to gain direct access to A.Q. Khan which was denied and this denial has invoked strong pressures on Pakistan. Undoubtedly both India and Pakistan are facing energy deficiency problem and both are engaged in exploring various sources to meet the rising demand for energy. Two track approaches towards two allies on similar problem not only reflects more confusion than clarity but also the well known double standards of the Americans.   

While the agreement still does not recognize India as a nuclear weapon state, the deal will enable its existing 16 nuclear plants and 14 future civil nuclear plants to come under international inspections. The U.S and other nuclear supplier nations will provide fuel and technology to build Indian civil nuclear program. It is believed in some quarters that this reward compensates India for possible strategic role against China. 

Not only the deal has upset the strategic balance and made India more obdurate in resolution of disputes with its neighbors. Already, it is seen to be foot-dragging on India-Pakistan peace process, and has been non-responsive to many peace proposals put up by President Musharraf for resolution of the Kashmir dispute. In addition, there are the problems of Sir Creek, Siachin, and water related disputes like Wullar, Kishanganga, and Bghlihar. 

The deal has drastically tilting the military balance in India’s favor. Resultantly, it could spur a new arms race and lead to instability and tension in South Asia. Through this deal India aspires for a global power status and the Americans seem to be going out of way to facilitate India’s quest for a global power status. This seems like a stepping-stone for recognition as a full-fledged nuclear power. Some Indians also see this development that would further strengthen India’s case for a UNSC permanent membership. 

India happens to be the initiator of nuclear weapons in the Subcontinent. It invoked the “China threat” as justification for its nuclear detonation. If India had not done so, Pakistan would not have carried out its nuclear tests and the Subcontinent might have been spared from nuclearization. Many critics of deal see it as rewarding a nuclear weapon proliferator. Iraq was punished on the suspicions that it was making forbidden weapons which were never found but India has been rewarded for making the weapons of mass destruction and transforming a non-nuclear South Asia into a nuclearized South Asia. 

Not only the Act is discriminatory, but it also enables India to divert its indigenously produced fissile material to its military program, while obtaining fuel for its civilian reactors from NSG. India intends to invest $100 billon for expanding nuclear energy program for the next 10 years in which the US companies shall be getting major contracts. The diversion of military fissile material towards production of greater nuclear weapons will create nuclear imbalance in the region — thus spurring a new arms race and might lead to military adventures by a ‘big neighbor. 

India’s self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing can be violated at any time on the pleas of national security; it has not defined any upper limits for its deterrence capability and it would lead to vertical proliferation by liberating its existing un-safeguarded fissile material. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has already categorically stated in the upper house of Indian parliament that India is not bound on nuclear testing by a foreign legislature. As a matter of fact the latest operational agreement of July 2007 has clearly side stepped the issue of further testing. Perhaps that is why the Indian Defense Minister recently stated that the deal would not interfere with India’s weaponization program. 

However, in case of the proposed FMCT treaty is finalized, and, India becomes a party to it, then it would leave no choice for India to produce missile material in future. But the existing un-safeguarded fissile material would remain a cause of concern. Besides, India’s commitment to the IAEA safeguards and Additional Protocol is ‘voluntary’ so it can be withdrawn any time, if it feels that its national interests are threatened. Furthermore, if India is accommodated as an exception by the NSG it would contravene its own guidelines which would not only reduce its effectiveness but would set precedents for future exceptions for other nations. 

Even the phraseology employed to justify the deal with India by the American officials appear to be ludicrous. According to American officials the deal is ‘unique for a unique country’ and it ‘stands alone’. Probably it is true in the sense that US has supported NPT regime in the past and applied sanctions and other punitive measures to discourage the likely proliferators but this deal is rewarding a proliferator India-a unique country which has forcefully suppressed all freedom movements, killed laces of innocent civilians, violated human rights at will, used violence in the region frequently, prevented the advent of peace by pursuing hegemonic pursuits ect.

The writer works for Islamabad Policy research Institute.