Resentment Against The Americans

The News, Sun, Oct,28, 2001.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema


Since the American started its aerial strikes against the Talibans, the reaction in various parts of the world have been gradually registering a steady increase. The initial muted voices began to find a wider expression on the streets as the bombing intensified. Being next door and having a large Pakhtoon population coupled with Islamic bonds with the Afghans, the reaction in Pakistan is somewhat understandable. Apart from the vision of many who consider it a war against Islam, there exist a very large reservoir of resentment against the Americans.

Many reasons account for the existence of wide spread resentment against the Americans. Among them four seems to have contributed more than the others and deserve fuller treatment. These include American letdowns, quick embrace of India, Jewish and India propaganda, and nuclear developments in the region. In addition non-recognition of the American mistakes and blunders committed during their linkages with the regional powers and war against the Soviets. First let me deal with what I call American letdowns. Only four major letdowns are being discussed here. Towards the end of the 50s not only Pakistan had joined three major cold war alliances (US-Pak Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, SEATO, CENTO) but also its strict adherence to the spirit of the pacts earned her the title of being the most faithful ally of the west.

In 1962 Sino-India border war took place. India quickly bypassed its non-aligned policy and asked for help from the west. Pakistan, for obvious reasons, became apprehensive over the possibilities of US rushing military aid to India, which was perceived by the Pakistanis as a factor that could up set the existing strategic balance. Being an alliance partner, Pakistan expressed its apprehensions to the Americans. The American President Kennedy wrote a letter to Pakistani President promising that Pakistan would be consulted before military aid was sent to India. Despite the existence of such a promise, the military aid was sent to India and Pakistan was merely informed and not consulted as promised. This was viewed as the first major let down.

Following the Indo-Pak war of 1965, the Americans announced what they termed 'an evenhanded policy'. They imposed an arms embargo against both India and Pakistan. What the Americans perhaps did not consider that, at that time, Pakistan was heavily dependent upon American arms. While Pakistan's dependency upon Americans for arms procurement was around 80 per cent, the Indian dependency upon American weapons was no more than 20 per cent. When the stoppage of deliveries took place Pakistan was deprived of 80% of much need weaponry whereas India was only deprived of 20% of its weaponry from American sources. Was this an even-handed policy? It was viewed as the second let down.

Soon after the outbreak of 1971 Indo-Pak war, it became quite clear that the Soviets were directly involved in the war. It was expected that the Americans would immediately come to the assistance of Pakistan, as they were required to do so in accordance with the spirit of SEATO. But the Americans did not help the Pakistanis. All they did was to order an aircraft carrier Enterprise to move into Bay of Bengal. Interestingly the Enterprise took sixteen years to reach Pakistan because when it reached Bay of Bengal in 1971,the East Pakistan had already become an independent country called Bangladesh. Roughly sixteen years later it made a friendly call at the port of Karachi. This was the third letdown.

The fourth let down is relatively recent and perhaps that's why many Pakistanis often refer to it. Following the end of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan and the death of the cold war, the American strategy focused on how to disengage them from the region. Not much was done either for the future political framework of Afghanistan and the plight of the Afghan refugees living in Pakistan. Almost all the donor agencies began to withdraw form their once vociferously proclaimed moral duties rather quickly. The net result was that Pakistan was left alone to cope with the burden of looking after 3.5 million Afghan refugees. To make things more difficult even the Americans pulled out of their commitments.

The second major factor that has been contributing almost regularly towards the existing large reservoir of resentments against the Americans is, 9if fact, a direct product of their changed regional policy. Admittedly every country has to modify its policies in accordance with the requirements of its own national interest and dictates of changing environs, but one rarely witnesses quick summersault in relations with good friends.
While the Pakistanis were confronted with the problems that were the legacy of the Afghan war against the Soviets, the Americans quick embrace of India began to confirmed the then prevalent belief that the Americans were all the time using Pakistan in order to secure closer ties with the Indians. Abandoning a friend and embracing the main enemy of former friend did not go down well with the Pakistanis. What hurt them most was the way the Americans rushed to cultivate India soon after the death of the cold war.

Linked with it is the third important reason causing resentment against the Americans, which is the product of American double standards. Throughout the post cold war era, American double standards have become much more pronounced than was the case during the cold war. One set of rules is applied to describe the Israeli aggression and totally other set of rules is employed to denounce the Palestinian defensive agitation. Somewhat similar approached was also being practiced with regard to South Asia in general and to the Kashmiris struggle in particular.

In its attempts to quickly befriend India, it began to be drift gradually into the propaganda traps set jointly as well as in their individual capacities by both India and Israel. The Americans began to demonstrate far greater trust in the untested India than they ever did in Pakistan, which was indeed a tested friend of the US. Cognizant of the ground realities that India had enjoyed close association with the Soviets which after the cold war continued with the successor state of Russia, the market forces unleashed by the departure of the cold war continued to influence the Americans to drift rather quickly closer to India. Indeed this is understandable. But to readily accept Indian interpretations of regional developments so quickly certainly generated disappointments.

What is incomprehensible is the negligible treatment accorded to the Pakistani interests. Not only India was overtly being preferred for almost everything but also Indian propaganda was invariably bought. Pakistani interpretations of development viewed as lacking in credibility. Many Pakistanis were disappointed with the American attitudes. Since we are constantly experiencing Indian duplicity and highhandedness, some allowance is due to American ignorance of the Indian hidden agendas.

The final factor adding further resentment to the already existing large stocks is directly linked with the American sanction policies with regard to the region. It is a well-established fact that Indian nuclear policy openly disregarded the global quest for non-proliferation and effectively impeded progress on this front. India acquired nuclear weapons in order to cater for its own hegemonic ambitions and much desired global role. Pakistan, on the other hand, was compelled to acquire nuclear capability in order to ensure its own survival. On the nuclear front India is the main culprit but the global community decided to award similar punishments to both India and Pakistan. Had India not acquired the nuclear weapons, Pakistan would certainly have refrained from such pursuits.

A combination of the above mentioned factors have contributed considerably towards the enlargement of the existing somewhat limited resentment-reservoir. Not only the above mentioned factors were constantly making their contributions but the non-recognition of the mistakes committed along with being easily carried away by the Indian propaganda have widened the resentment reservoir. When the recent coalition against terrorism was being formed, skepticism regarding American credibility was openly discussed. Frequently doubts about American reliability were passionately expressed.

While some Pakistani tends to exploit the existing resentment against the Americans either for advancing their own agenda or reminding them not to commit similar mistakes in future, it would not be correct to overlook the rapidly changing developments that are likely to benefit Pakistan especially in the long run. But more needs to done in order to attain a certain level of credibility within Pakistani circles. Admittedly the intelligentsia comprehends and recognizes the rapidly changing image of Pakistan but what about the man in the street who is unlikely to be convinced unless he either visibly see them or becomes a direct beneficiary. Writing off some portion of debts would be easily comprehended and appreciated by many. Large investments and increased trading concessions would also attract considerable support. Similarly concerted efforts and a just policy over Kashmir would not only be welcomed but would also quickly erode misgivings about American intentions. A firm commitment that international community would not abandon the Afghan refugees this time could go a long to re-establish the lost confidence.