Refusal to acknowledge the reality

The POST, Sun, Apr,30, 2006.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema


Some statements emanating from the US administration not only tend to inject confusion but also reflect non-recognition of the existing realities. Reportedly one such statement is one that has been recently posted on State Department website regarding the non-recognition of India as a nuclear weapon state. The statement stressed that while the US has concluded a deal for civil nuclear cooperation with India, it was not recognizing the country as a nuclear weapon state. ‘We do not recognize India as a nuclear weapon state and do not seek to amend or renegotiate the NPT. We understand, however that India will not join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state’.

Three aspect of this statement needs to be subjected to critical discussions and analysis; non-recognition of India as a nuclear weapon state, Indian refusal to join NPT as a non-weapon state, and not seeking to amend or renegotiate the NPT. Diplomatically no one can question the American assertions. On the face of it the US is telling the truth. It is stressing that it does not recognize India as nuclear weapon state and has no intention to recognize it as such. However the point that needs to be advanced is that US says that it has a civilian nuclear deal and India has been asked to separate its civilian and military establishments. This implies that US recognizes the legitimacy of India’s civil nuclear program but does not want to recognize the reality of India being a nuclear weapon state. 

By seeking the separation of civilian program from the military pursuit the US has implicitly recognized the India’s legitimate military related nuclear weapon program but feels the time has not come to openly acknowledge it. It amounts to saying that we know that India is a nuclear weapon state but we don’t want to recognize it as such. The deal allows the import of nuclear fuel for civilian reactors which in turn could facilitate the India’s weapon program. Besides, the exclusion of fast breeder reactors from the civilian list of nuclear establishments  amounts to implicit recognition and encouragement of India’s military related nuclear weapon program. It needs to be asserted here that the fast breeder reactors are ideally suited  for plutonium production for warheads and were previously claimed to be part of civilian program.

The second strand of the argument is that India does not want to join the NPT system as a non-nuclear state. There is nothing new about it. Not only the American have known about it, almost everybody concerned or involved in the maintenance of NPT regime is familiar with this Indian strand. For years the Indians have been asserting that they may be recognized as a nuclear weapons state which would enable them to work within the NPT system. Irrespective of the factors that motivated India, once they have acquired nuclear weapon state capability, realistic considerations should have taken priority.  

The official statement further added the third assertion that ‘the US was not seeking to change the non-proliferation treaty to accommodate India as a nuclear power’. Again it is a correct diplomatic statement. Yet implicitly US is not only destroying the incumbent NPT regime but also elevating and recognizing India as a nuclear weapon state outside the NPT. To lend more legitimacy the statement also categorically recognized India’s position why it refuses to sign NPT as a non-weapon state. While the US has stopped short of calling India a nuclear weapon state, it has conferred upon India the desired status of a nuclear weapon state. It amounts to what an American observer has put it as ‘dressing and undressing simultaneously’.

Again the assertion that US is not seeking to amend NPT or even renegotiate the treaty appears to be correct. Indeed one has to acknowledge that US is not seeking alteration in the NPT yet one cannot over look the fact that it has to modify its own anti-proliferation laws in order to accommodate India. It amounts to knocking off some of the non-proliferation rules in order to please India. What is forgotten is the fact that it was India which introduced nuclear weapons in South Asia. Pakistan would never have opted, on its own, for nuclear weapons acquisitions, had it not been for India. 

The major blows to NPT regime were struck by India and Israel. Now the US wants to reward India for damaging the regime by providing missile related dual use technology and ensuring the requisite fuel. The US is also trying to influence the Nuclear Suppliers Group to bend its rules in order to accommodate India. If the NSG agreed to amend its own rules in order to accommodate India only, it would create a dangerous precedent. If the rules are changed in congruence with already adopted or generally accepted principles and not specifically to reward one particular country, then the amendment or change of rule is unlikely to invoke any reaction.

However it needs to be mentioned here that Russians have already delivered nuclear fuel for two Indian reactors ignoring even American request for a delay until the rules are formally changed to allow such transfer. This indeed amount to violation of NSG rules. The 45 – nation Nuclear Supplier’s Group has yet to inject suitable modifications in its existing set of rules to permit such transfer to India. The NSG was waiting to take up the issue until the American Congress approves the passage of Indo-US nuclear deal.

Neither the global non-proliferation community nor the leading countries opposing the deal have been able to either dissuade US or derail the implementation of the nuclear deal so far. The rationale often advanced in support of the deal revolves around the impressive Indian record on nuclear commerce and the dire need of developing close strategic partnership with India and Indian performance in democracy. While there is no doubt that India has admirable record of functional democracy, there is lot to be said about the other two stands. Undoubtedly the argument that Indian record on nuclear commerce is good is an argument primarily employed to deny similar deal to other interested country like Pakistan. After all one cannot forget that it was India that initiated the nuclear weapon proliferation in South Asia.

Compared to some other countries, India’s record in terms of nuclear commerce is indeed impressive but it has not been totally clean as some of the Indian companies have violated anti-proliferation laws in the past. However the argument revolving around the rapidly increasing strategic importance of India particularly if viewed within the context of rising China and need for a major partner in the Indian Ocean appears to be relatively more convincing. The assumption that strong India would facilitate the balance in Asia and would help in keeping the sea lanes open is not without some merits.

Another aspect of the deal revolves around what is called the profit motives. It is quite understandable the US is fully cognizant of India’s growing energy requirements and its quest to explore more and more areas for energy procurement. In this connection nuclear energy could alleviate the situation. Why should the Americans be deprived of benefits that can accrue from taking advantage of the large Indian market?

Perhaps the logical way out for the Americans is come out openly and stress that since India is a country they want to build for their future global and regional strategic pursuits rather then trying to play with words in order to generate the image that they are still adhering to NPT rules and would not recognize India as a nuclear weapon state but supply it the requisite fuel and technology for civilian nuclear establishments. Undoubtedly the interests of both Washington and New Delhi have converged in many areas at this point of time. It is better to be a realistic and avoid attempts to confuse the issue.   

The writer works for Islamabad Policy Research Institute.