Quest for nuclear restraint regime in S Asia

The News, Sun, May,2, 2004.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema



The acceptance of Pakistan’s offer to hold talks relating to nuclear matters on May 25-26 by India is indeed a good omen. The proposal is aimed to discuss nuclear confidence building measures. The offer appears to be a follow up of peace talks that started in January this year when a joint press statement was issued indicating to settle all bilateral disputes including the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir. The latest Pakistani initiative reflects another milestone in it continuous efforts to lower tension and resolve all bilateral disputes between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan is pretty well known for its continuous efforts aimed to inject restraints soon after both India and Pakistan had become nuclear weapons states. In fact prior to the nuclearisation of South Asia, Pakistan tried very hard to prevent the advent of nuclear weapons but failed miserably primarily because of Indian determination to acquire nuclear weapons. In fact Pakistan floated many proposals suggesting the creation of nuclear free zone, mutual acceptance of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards, simultaneous signing of the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty), joint declaration to renounce development of nuclear weapons, bilateral facilities to inspect each others nuclear facilities, and signing of regional test ban treaty but non of these proposals elicited positive response from the Indians.

It needs to be stressed here that the international community did not demonstrate any real enthusiasm to prevent the nuclearisation of South Asia. More pressures were applied to Pakistan to abandon its quest to acquire nuclear weapons despite the fact that Pakistan had repeatedly asserted that it would immediately sign the NPT provided India also does the same. Logical course of action entails that the members of international community should have applied more pressures against India but they did not. Instead they decided to apply more pressures upon Pakistan in order to secure an announcement by the Pakistani authorities that they would sign NPT. The logic that was advanced at the time was that once Pakistan signs NPT, they would be able to secure Indian signature quite easily.

The obvious interpretations of such an argument are three. First, international community has a limited comprehension of Indian intentions. Second, they fully comprehend Indian intensions but also are acutely conscious of the limited nature of their influence over India. Third, they understands fully Indian intentions but were never genuinely interested to secure Indian signature upon the NPT. It appears that they were more interested to deprive Pakistan of its then likely nuclear assets whereas they were inclined to accept India as a nuclear weapons state.

The latest Pakistani effort is indeed aimed to inject further restraints on the accidental employment of such destructive weapons. It is assumed that no one contemplates the deliberate use of these weapons unless one party pushes the other and creates a situation in which no option is left for the target country.  It is reflective of a well-entrenched desire to avoid any future war-particularly a nuclear war. However any desire to secure a requisite level of restraints has to be placed in a particular strategic context. The factors that determine restraints in South Asian strategic context include the nature of perceived threat, existing strategic balance, the purpose and objective of a certain force level, size and location of the involved actors, and finally the availability of resources.

Given the peculiar nature of South Asia’s strategic context and the deeply entrenched hostility between India and Pakistan especially over the ongoing Kashmir dispute, it is not too far fetched to assume that the injection of restraint measures would not be all that smooth. However one must highlight the fact that most South Asians realize the utility of such measures that can inject peace and stability and are overtly supportive of such pursuits.

In view of the incumbent level of complexities and despite internal difficulties, both India and Pakistan have demonstrated their desire to make the area safer. Cognizant of the fact that there is no winner in a nuclear confrontation and acutely aware of the grave dangers that accompany the possession of nuclear weapons along with their career systems, both the Indians and the Pakistanis have started a process to introduce restraint measures.

The text of Memorandum of understanding that was signed on 22 Feb.1999 at Lahore specifically suggested many CBMs (Confidence Building Measures). Among the suggested measures, the most significant were bilateral consultations on security concepts and nuclear doctrine, advance notification of missile tests, reducing risks of unauthorized and accidental use of nuclear weapons, unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear tests, reviewing the implementation of existing CBMs, setting up of appropriate consultative mechanism to monitor and ensure effective implementation of CBMs etc.

It was expected that the nuclear experts would soon meet to thrash out number of technical problems but unfortunately the experts never met. The goodwill that was demonstrated at the time of Lahore declaration soon evaporated because of three developments. First the Indian never lived up to their promise, which was made in a statement during their Lahore visit (21-22 Feb 1999) to support Pakistan’s membership application of Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). The meeting was held in March and India opposed Pakistan’s efforts for membership. Second, the Hindu miscreants attacked the bus that was coming back from Delhi to Lahore. Third, the April-March witnessed Kargil clashes which, in turn, polluted the prevailing atmosphere.

Since April 18, 2003 when the Indian Prime Minister made an offer to discuss all issues including the Kashmir dispute, overall atmosphere has considerably improved. Given the incumbent level of improvised atmosphere, one expects that both sides would be earnestly forthcoming to tackle something, which is a source of great concerns not just to the regional states but also to the international community. The talks on nuclear restraint regime attract everybody’s attention. It is expected that in view of the full cognizant of the dangers involved in nuclear confrontations, more and more measures aimed to minimize the dangers would be quickly agreed upon.

Already the agreement of not attacking each other’s nuclear installations is operative. And to further strengthen it, the two countries regularly exchange the lists of nuclear establishments on 1^st January each year. Another CBM that is constructively contributing is the advance notification of missile tests. Whenever a missile test is contemplated by either India or Pakistan, they inform the other of such likely development.

Nuclear restraint regime implies the existence of a series of agreements along with effective use of incumbent CBMs and conventions conducive to generating restraints. The rationale of restraint regimes is to minimize the dangers of deliberate, accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. In all cases the overwhelming dangers involved tend to influence the actors to inject methods or evolve a mechanism that make the use of weapon impossible on one hand and also generate confidence among the adversaries on the other.

To further strengthen restraint regime within South Asian context five measures could be contributed usefully. First, the warhead and the missile should be kept separately. They should not be mated. Second, the missile should be installed at a distance, which is deemed as safer by the target country. Third, mutual consultation should be continuous. Regular communication is vital for the sustenance of restraint regime. While it is a known fact that the communication systems are vulnerable to both physical and electronic attacks, it is indeed imperative to have a reliable, secure, and survivable communication channels. Fourth, establish nuclear risk reduction centers as quickly as possible. Finally there is a continuous need for regular demonstration of political will by the actors involved. The practice of the above mentioned elements could indeed strengthen a nuclear restraint regime. It is expected that some of these measures would be subjected to intense and comprehensive discussion in the next proposed talks on nuclear related matters.