The nuclear black markets issue

The POST, Sun, May,13, 2007.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema

Once again the issue of nuclear black markets has surfaced and once again the projection has been undertaken with reference to Pakistan. As a matter of fact a strategic dossier (prepared by the International Institute of Strategic Studies based in London, UK) has recently hit the pages of many newspapers all around the world. Two aspects of this development deserve comments. First, the dossier highlights that a large number of countries acquired technologies through illicit means. Second, the report acknowledges that Pakistan has established a very strong command and control.

Even since the nuclear weapons were developed initially by the Americans and later by many other countries, the threat of its proliferation has been a subject of intense debates and serious considerations. Since these are weapons of mass destruction, the employment of preventive measures is often viewed somewhat rational. In addition the world was engaged in securing more and more arms control measures in order to make the world safer. There is no doubt that commendable strides have been made in this direction. 

Perhaps the most important arms control measure in this regard is the advent of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But the treaty introduced a cast system in terms of dividing the world into two groups; those who have the nuclear weapons prior to 1968 and those who did not possess the weapons by that cut off date. No third category was envisaged at the time of signing of the NPT. It was assumed that the entire world would more or less accept the NPT. It needs to be stressed here that almost all countries became members of the NPT; some immediately signed some joined it latter.

What the treaty appeared to have ignored is the provision to accommodate a third category covering unusual situation which may develop from time to time. After all it is generally acknowledged that the incumbent international political system is anarchic and is far from being perfect. All states are Sovereign independent. Despite the existence of international organization devised to maintain international peace and security, it is also generally accepted that in the ultimate analysis the nations will have to fall back upon their own strength.

In this connection the most appropriate cases are of those states that are deeply involved in conflict situations. The logical course of action in such cases is to focus on the resolution of the conflict. If the conflict is removed then the need for acquiring dangerous weapons invariably minimized initially and eventually evaporates. However the record indicates that not many efforts were put in this direction for a variety of reasons. Admittedly some conflicts were resolved but the main conflicts were continued to linger on which in turn influenced some nations to acquire the nuclear weapons.

There are many reasons that influence nations to acquire nuclear weapons but two are known to be paramount; security and prestige. In some cases both prestige and security factors are applicable with a varying degree of emphasis. Those nations that have acquired the nuclear weapons for purely security reason clearly reflect their acute sense of insecurity compelling them to secure themselves. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan certainly falls into this category.

Any nation that is feeling insecure and is engaged in a conflict situation, it is not too far fetched to assume that it would try its best within available resources to acquire weapons that generate some form of security. Had the great powers focused more on the removal of causation, perhaps the need for acquiring dangerous weaponry would be reduced to the bear minimum. The incumbent sense of insecurity often influences nations to opt for a course of action which it deems fit in order to remove the sense of insecurity.

Those nations which find not much help from both the great powers and the international organizations in the resolution of their conflicts in which they are deeply involved, one can easily assume that they would employ all means to attain their objectives including exploring the black market. The tendency to put the entire blame on the single sources only reflects the inability to gain correct information. This is probably one of the few times that a report has identified many countries that have allegedly sought technologies through illicit means. Again the emphasis here should be on exploring the underneath causes that have influenced nations to undertake such pursuits. 

The second aspect of the report that deserves comment deals with the recognition that Pakistan has established a strong command and control system. For years Pakistan nuclear program and its incumbent command and control has been subjected to intense criticism highlighting how unsafe its program is. In addition accusations and insinuations that Pakistan’s weapons could fall into the wrong hands. Such wild accusations, mostly emanating from western sources, were frequently hurled at Pakistan especially after 9/11 tragedy. By focusing only on Pakistan many countries completely ignored that such accusation could also be applied to some other areas. 

Many in Pakistan are convinced that it is part of a systematic campaign against the only Muslim nuclear weapon state. The argument runs that many in western countries were extremely unhappy over Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons but they were facing an acute dilemma. The dilemma was how to allow India to acquire weapons and prevent Pakistan from its acquisition with full cognizance that if India acquired the weapons, Pakistan would not be too far behind. 

After the 9/11 tragedy the focus shifted on the non state actors. Once again stories began to appear systematically against Pakistan’s nuclear program with an emphasis to paint Pakistan’s command and control as weak which could be breached by the non-state actors. It was repeatedly alleged that non-state actors could easily gain the much desired access to these dangerous weapons. Despite repeated assurances by the Pakistani authorities that its weapons are in safe hands and there is no way that non-state actors could acquire the desired access.

It is a matter of great satisfaction and encouragement that many in the west are now treading a realistic path and have openly recognized that Pakistan has established a very strong and command and control system.  However the report now alleges and highlights the dangers of penetration of organized crime groups into the nuclear black market. For this it would be appropriate if more focus is on western markets where not just the organized crime groups frequently operate and the requisite material is available in those markets. 

Perhaps the best approach to discourage nuclear smuggling is to treat the underneath causes that are influencing the individuals, groups and states to indulge in such pursuits. This implies more concentration on the ongoing conflicts with a proper diagnostic approach and the application of appropriate medication and recipes. The sources threatening proliferation often revolve around the imbalanced approaches towards conflict resolution and perpetuation of gross injustices. The great powers should focus on conflict resolution with sincerity and devotion which would certainly have the desired impact on the existing sense of insecurity which in turn could reduce the threat of proliferation.

The writer works for Islamabad Policy research Institute.