More Confidence Building Measures

Pakistan OBSERVER, Sat, Oct,13, 2007.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema
 

The foreign office has recently announced that India and Pakistan would hold expert level talks on conventional and nuclear confidence building measures during the third week of October, 2007.  It is expected that during this meeting the previously agreed confidence building measures (CBM) such as agreement on speedy return of inadvertent border crossers and incidents at sea would be formalized. 

The injection of CBMs is not really a new phenomenon in South Asia in general and between India and Pakistan in particular. Since the hurried departure of the British from South Asia and the partition of the Indian subcontinent, both India and Pakistan have signed many agreements aimed to generate confidence and reduce tensions. Among them perhaps the most notable are; Liaquat‑Nehru Pact (1951), Indus Water Treaty (1960), Tashkent Agreement (1966), Rann of Kutch Agreement (1968), Shimla Accord (1972), Salal Dam Agreement (1978), and the establishment of the Joint Commission (1983). 

With the exception of the Joint Commission, all others were the products of either a crisis or a war that necessitated a logical end to the preceding developments. Similarly, both India and Sri Lanka were able to secure agreements on stateless people (between Shastri and Mrs. Bandaranaike in 1964); the fate of Kuchichativu Island was decided in favor of Sri Lanka in 1979. In addition, the Indian Army has played a peacekeeping role in Sri Lanka in the 80s. 

The main irritant between India and Bangladesh has been the Farrakka Barrage dispute which in recent times has been resolved amicably in 1996 (Hasina and Gowda in Dec. 1996), though the falling water level of Ganges does elicit criticism periodically from certain quarters. Earlier the border issues have been successfully resolved. The main sources of tensions between India and Nepal revolved around sharing of Waters of Mahakali River, 1950 treaty and migrations in the Terai region. Almost all of them have been resolved in some form. With liberal provisions dealing trade, transit and currency, some kind of economic union already exists. 

The main conflict between India and Pakistan revolves around the Kashmir dispute. Despite the advent of so many CBMs, the normalization. still seems somewhat of an illusive pursuit. Since the end of the 1971 Indo‑Pak war, many CBMs have been adopted with a pronounced emphasis upon military CBMs initially. The earliest one came immediately after the 1971 war. A 'Hotline' between the DGMOs (Directors General of Military Operations) was established in 1971. 

The existing CBMs can be grouped broadly into four categories; communication, notification, consultation, and goodwill measures. Communication Measures includes measures like DGMOs hotline, hotline between sector commanders, hotline between two air forces, naval vassals, Prime Ministers hotlines, people to people contacts, track II diplomacy, NGOs, dialogue between non-governmental groups like Neemrana Initiative etc.) 

Similarly notification measures include advance notification regarding military exercises or missile tests. Inviting other side’s military observers to military exercises or making joint declaration such as prohibition of chemical weapons are also deemed as good CBMs. The consultation measures include measures like joint India-Pakistan Commission or Foreign Secretary level talks. The goodwill measures include participation of various officials, both civilian and military, to various seminars and conferences, exchange of sports teams to play matches in each other’s country, visits of non-official and officials, and regular official meetings such as the last four years have witnessed regular meetings of the officials to deal with various matters. 

The term CBM covers a very large canvas ranging from a simple unwritten understanding between the two adversaries to a treaty. A journey from simple understanding to the signing of a treaty could be viewed as part of the CBM process provided confidence is generated between the adversaries at various stages of progression. A CBM is a bilateral or a multilateral measure that builds confidence, arrests the undesirable drift towards open hostilities, reduces tensions, and encourages the adversaries to make contact for negotiations without taxing too much the operative policy pursuits. 

There is no doubt that more and more CBMs could further improve atmosphere for talks but one should also realize that CBMs do not solve conflicts; they merely make the atmosphere conducive for talks. If the talks keep extending or injecting more and more CBMs but has nothing to show on the conflict resolution front, then disappointment begin to pile up which could result in impeding the effective implementations of already agreed CBMs. 

As mentioned above that CBMs are expected to arrest dangerous drift towards undesired armed conflict, try to reverse the trend, reduce tension, initiate a process of confidence and trust building which, in turn, could and may facilitate the birth of a process aimed towards the conflict resolution. Since the 2004 the peace process has come into existence. The past record indicates that the network of CBMs has been gradually expanding and the atmosphere is vastly improved for negotiations. 

The negotiation itself may or may not result in the resolution of conflicts. The CBMs must be viewed as means and not an end itself. A review of the past couple of decades clearly reveal that the introduction of the CBMs have alleviated the situation and reduced tensions. A close scrutiny of crises like the Brasstack(1987), Crisis of 90 (1990), Kargil clashes (1999) and troops confrontation (2002) clear recognize the varied contributions made by the CBMs. 

The most recent manifestation of CBMs’ contributions is the vastly improved atmosphere that has enormously facilitated the resumption of communication and transportation links and has also vastly increased opportunities for people to people contacts. It was quite rightly assumed that if the trend continued the negotiations regarding the continuous issue and disputes would start. The negotiations have started but so far they have not yet yielded any constructive result. While the usefulness of CBMs cannot be either denied or even undermined and it is also assumed that the India-Pakistan tangle needs more and more CBMs, it is also recognized by almost all concerned that the time has come to show some tangible results on the conflict resolution front. Both Siachin and Sir Creek dispute are ripe for resolutions and their resolution is bound to strengthen the ongoing peace process and could also facilitate enormously the negotiations over a complex dispute like the ongoing Kashmir dispute.

Many in Pakistan are getting little impatient as they see no progress on Kashmir dispute. The increasing number of skeptical people could impact upon the ongoing peace process. Not only they bitterly criticize the Indian attitude which appears to be extremely favorable towards, CBMs, Trade and people to people contact whereas they have not demonstrated similar level of interests regarding Siachin, Sir creek, water disputes and the overall Kashmir dispute. Undoubtedly time has come to make concerted efforts on the conflict resolution front as well otherwise unexpected backlash could take a heavy toll of the vastly improved atmosphere.

The writer works for Islamabad Policy research Institute.