Kabul Jirga: will it work?

The POST, Sun, Aug,19, 2007.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema


Etymologically the word Jirga derives from a Persian word Jaar Gah which means council or assembly or meeting. In common parlance the word implies a tribal assembly of the elders which often take decisions by consensus. Traditionally it is considered to be part of dispute resolution mechanism. Sometimes it acts like a court in that area where the ordinary courts are not yet established. In tribal areas of Pakistan Jirga enjoys the prestige of a court. A grand Jirga is often referred as ‘Loya Jirga’ whereas people’s Jirga is called ‘Wolesi Jirga’. 

Given the inability of both Afghanistan and Pakistan to establish sustainable peace in the region, a joint Afghan-Pak Jirga was convened in Kabul from 9th  to 12th August 2007 which was addressed not only by both the Presidents of Pakistan and Afghanistan but also by the Prime Minister of Pakistan. At the end of this grand Jirga in which 700 representatives consisting of parliamentarians, political parties, religious scholars, tribal elders, provincial councils, civil society and business community from both sides participated, a joint declaration was issued. 

Recognizing terrorism as a common threat to both countries, the members of this grand Jirga agreed to continue war on terror as an integral part of the national policies and security strategy of the two countries. The participants of the grand Jirga decided to constitute a smaller Jirga consisting of 25 prominent members from each side primarily for practical reason. The smaller Jirga was mandated to expedite the ongoing dialogue process for peace, to hold regular meetings for monitoring and implementation of decisions and to plan and facilitate the convening of the next peace Jirga. 

Cognizant of the nexus between drugs and terrorism, the Jirga not only condemned the cultivation, processing and trafficking of the poppy and other illicit substances but also called upon both governments to wage an all out war against this menace. The Jirga took note of the responsibilities of the international community in enabling Afghanistan to provide alternative livelihood to the farmers. It was stressed that the two governments with the help of international community should implement infrastructure, economic and social sector projects in the affected areas. 

The question that whether or not the grand Jirga would be able to attain the stated objectives has invoked many varied interpretation. Whatever one may say, there were certain important questions and issues raised in the Jirga though some of them were unable to solicit a consensus such as the issue of undesired Indian Consulates at Kandhar and Jalalabad. These Consulates are known to be directly involved in nefarious activities against Pakistani adjacent provinces. An agreement could not be reached as the Afghan government opposed it rather strongly. Some observers feel that Afghan government gets about US$750 million development aid from India and they did not want to loose this amount by annoying the Indians. However what is important is that this issue has been raised in the grand Jirga. 

Perhaps the most important and successful outcome of the Jirga was the pledge relating to undertake joint struggle against the terrorists and extremists. Almost everybody agreed that the terrorism was a serious challenge to the integrity and solidarity of both the countries. Both pledged to jointly fight terrorism and resolved not to allow cross-border movement of terrorists and setting up of their training camps. 

Given the history of blame game in the recent past, this pledge is very significant. Instead of heavy indulgence in the blame game which only highlighted the trust deficit, the joint effort to deal with this major danger is indeed a welcome development. The Jirga not only provided an opportunity for important individuals to listen to each others points of views but also worked as an arresting mechanism for rapidly deteriorating situation. Since the point regarding the trust deficit was adequately highlighted and the need for establishing trust between the two people of Afghanistan and Pakistan was fully recognized in the Jirga, it is expected that the smaller Jirga would further suggest confidence building measures (CBMs) which could help in eroding the edifice of distrust and facilitate the strengthening of the edifice of trust. 

One common interpretation regarding the convening of Loya Jirga was to remove the misperceptions, apprehensions and concerns of the two countries and to bring them closer. This objective appears to have been attained to a considerable extent. One cannot expect that all the suspicions and apprehensions would be effectively removed in one meeting but one can take some satisfaction that a constructive beginning has been made. 

The main criticism that has been highlighted revolves around the non-participation of the Talibans. While it is well known fact that why the Talibans decided to boycott the Jirga, one cannot altogether rule out a likely future contact between the smaller Jirga and the Taliban leaders. One cannot dispute the fact that Talibans are local Afghans with some sympathizers in parts of Pakistan’s tribal areas, it would indeed be appropriate for Talibans to respond positively to the expected future overtures by the Smaller Jirga. 

What has to be carefully looked at is that Talibans and the Al Qaeda should not be viewed as one. They are two different groups one consisting of local leaders seeking redress or share in power whereas other group (Al Qaeda) comprises of people who have come from outside the area who, in fact, are the landless leaders without any love or affiliation with the local tradition or norms. Not only their aspirations and attitudes are different but the policy pursuits could also be varied. Admittedly the outsider would try to make their case somewhat similar to the locals in order to secure the desire support, it is imperative that the smaller Jirga try to wean them away from the foreign element. 

One of the major excuses often advanced by Taliban is that they are not willing to sit with the foreign dominated regime. The Taliban also need to recognize that they are also tremendously influences, financed and controlled by foreign elements that may or may not stay in region while the Talibans cannot afford to leave their home. What should provide some satisfaction to Taliban is that implicitly the need to talk to them has been recognized. Therefore it is imperative for them to also respond to the overtures which are expected to be made by the smaller Jirga in near future. 

The critics have also been stressing that the much trumpeted Loya Jirga has ended without giving any roadmap for restoration of peace on both sides of Pak-Afghan border. One needs to recognize that this the first meeting of its kind between the two estranged neighbors and it is expected that smaller Jirga would soon take up its assignment and make contact with all the opposing forces. Once the issues from all sides are on the table, then one can expect that some mechanism for reconciliation and resolution could be evolved. Undoubted the convening of Loya Jirga was a good exercise and it is hoped that with sincere cooperation from all concerned would enable an early advent of peace and stability in the region.


The writer works for Islamabad Policy research Institute.