IPRI :: Islamabad Policy Research Institute

National Development and Security, Vol. ix, No. 4, Serial No. 36 (Summer 2001)

On December 16, 1993, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted a resolution, which called for the negotiations of ‘a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices’ [1] . Since then, serious negotiations for Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) have begun. In addition to the UN General Assembly’s endorsement of the concept, consultations have taken place among nations and at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD). Progress was made towards creation of a formal CD Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate to negotiate a cut-off agreement. These advancements pave the way for additional significant developments, which would make up the Treaty. Many provisions of the Treaty are only in their infancy and in some cases are waiting to be born. At the same time, these are not the easiest of times for making progress on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear weapons disarmament. The nuclear weapons have not been de-legitimized to the degree that was hoped after the end of the Cold War. The harsh reality is that none of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are contemplating the idea of dismantling their nuclear weapons. The Russians still regard nuclear weapons, as compensating for political and military weakness and capability that guarantee that Russian Federation will continue to be regarded as a great power. In United States, calls for nuclear deterrence against chemical and biological weapons, and concerns about the Russians and the Chinese have all raised the profile of nuclear weapons in the US strategic thinking [2] . Secondly, the United States (US) clear intentions to deploy Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems have initiated a new debate about the development, modernization and procurement of offensive and defensive weapon systems [3] . Thirdly, following the May 1998 nuclear test explosions, India and Pakistan announced that they had become nuclear weapon states and refused to submit to the provisions of UN Security Council resolution 1172. Fourthly, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’s entry into force is still in limbo [4] .

Nuclear Arms Control has failed to gain a significant domestic constituency in Pakistan. Despite it, Pakistan has not entirely opposed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (NNPR) [5] . It supports all equitable and multilateral measures to control the spread of nuclear weapons. Pakistan has proposed specific measures for nuclear disarmament, including a Convention to commit all States to the elimination of nuclear weapons [6] . Nevertheless, Pakistan has ruled out any unilateral decision regarding the fate of the country’s nuclear program. In fact, Pakistan’s policy regarding the NNPR is guided by its security needs. The Pakistani nuclear strategists held that the regional approach to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is complementary to international endeavors towards de-nuclearization. The most fascinating fact is that before the overt nuclearization of India and Pakistan, it had advocated for a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South Asia (NWFZSA) [7] . In October 1998, Pakistan formally proposed Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR) to India. This encompassed prevention of nuclear and ballistic missile race, risk reduction mechanisms and the proposition that nuclear deterrence should be pursued at the lowest possible level. India rejected Pakistan's SRR proposal. On July 30, 1998, Ambassador Munir Akram stated that, ‘Pakistan has consistently believed that a ban on the production of fissile materials should be promoted through a universal and non-discriminatory treaty in the CD and not through unilateral measures’. He also announced that Pakistan would join in promoting a decision for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to conduct negotiations [8] . But at the same time, Pakistan made it clear that it can not agree to any demand, for a moratorium on the production of fissile material before the conclusion of the FMCT. On December 26, 1998, Mr. Sartaj Aziz, the then foreign minister of Pakistan, while explaining Pakistan’s official stance on the FMCT to the National Assembly stated that Pakistan wanted a fissile material treaty, which promotes both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, as otherwise the Treaty would be discriminatory and thus ineffective. He added that Pakistan’s second concern was the unequal stockpiles of fissile material existing at the global, regional and sub-regional levels [9] . These declarations have given impetus to the national discussion on the FMCT. The purpose of the following discussion is to presume and understand the objectives of the FMCT, and to assess carefully the suitable option for Pakistan. Since, a considerable amount of misinformation has been floating around. Therefore, before entering into a final discussion on whether to participate in FMCT negotiations in coming meetings of CD and support anti fissile material forces or in other words sign or not, it is important to be clear on certain basic factors regarding the FMCT and the nuclear weapons potential of Pakistan.

The FMCT has been a long-standing goal of the international community. The international community has been unable to develop a consensus on the final draft of the Treaty because of some fundamental differences among members of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on the purpose and scope of the FMCT. The most problematic issue is whether the Treaty would be a measure of nuclear non-proliferation or it would address the issue of stockpiles of fissile material possessed by some States, through their progressive and balanced reduction, to promote the goal of nuclear disarmament. What can be the salient features of the FMCT? What will be the scope of the Treaty? Without the appropriate answer of these questions, it is impracticable to work out any policy about the FMCT. The framework of the FMCT, based on the consensus of CD members and accepted by the UN General Assembly would have yet to be finalized. In other wolds, a final FMCT may be several years away. Therefore, the salient features of the Treaty, in this article has been identified and enlisted from the recorded literature of negotiations about the FMCT scope and purpose, at the different international forums, particularly from the debates held at CD. These debates would be important determinants of the future constitution of the Treaty. Moreover, the history of the nuclear non-proliferation regime reveals that the consensus between United States and Russian Federation (earlier former Soviet Union) always had a decisive role in the formation of nuclear non-proliferation treaties. Rest of the States had little influence in these matters [10] . The following would be the technical aspects of the FMCT:

1. The FMCT targets the activities of the eight nuclear weapons states, which include United States, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, France, China, India, Israel, and Pakistan.

2. The Treaty shall be a non-discriminatory, multilateral, universal, and internationally effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material, which includes metal plutonium (after reprocessing), highly enriched uranium, and 233U, for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

3. The member states undertake not to produce fissile material to use in nuclear weapons or in any other nuclear explosive devices, and to prohibit and prevent any such production at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

4. The state party to the Treaty undertakes not to acquire by any other means fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or in any nuclear explosive devices, and to prohibit and prevent any such acquisition at any place under its jurisdiction and control.

5. The NWS states agree not to transfer to any state, person or other entity any fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or in other nuclear explosive devices; not to assist any state, person or other entity in the acquisition of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or in other nuclear explosives devices.

6. The Treaty shall prohibit the diversion of fissile material produced for other purposes to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

7. After entry into force the State parties to the Treaty shall declare all fissile materials they have produced. Declarations shall include where the materials were produced, where they are at the date of the declaration, what form they are in, and what is planned for them in the period ahead. In addition they shall declare existing fissile material production facilities, including those shut down, those decommissioned and those still in operation.

8. The member states accept IAEA inspections to verify that the Treaty obligations are being met. The NWS party to the Treaty will be required to submit all of its uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities to IAEA safeguards. The IAEA will verify the clandestine enrichment and reprocessing activities through special or challenge inspections. A special inspection is an inspection that the IAEA may perform at any site in the territory of a state party (regardless of whether the site has been declared or not). A challenge inspection is an inspection that can be performed at any site in the territory of a state party to the FMCT (regardless of whether the site has been declared), at the request of any other state party. A challenge inspection may include an observer from the requesting state party.

a) The FMCT would ban only future production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes. No limits would be set on the use of previously produced materials. In other words, the ban would curtail the nuclear programs of the threshold states.

b) The facilities for the production of fissile materials shall not be dismantled. Which keeps the option open for the NWS to end their moratorium on the fissile material production, and restart developing weapon grade material immediately.

c) The permission for producing material other than weapons fabrication makes it a complex issue. The FMCT verification regime may generate serious reservations among the nuclear weapon capable states. The division is obvious between those who supports verification regime based on mutual inspection and those who favors the inspection should be done by IAEA or another international organization. The FMCT and related verification systems whether capable to reveal or do not reveal past nuclear activities and capabilities of the member states. Above all the challenge inspections, with the right of the requesting party to participate as an observer in the inspection process generate serious reservations among the negotiating members. Some NWS wants to maintain the ambiguity about their nuclear weapons potential.

d) The declaration of previously produced nuclear weapons fissile materials would clash with one of the Treaty’s major non-proliferation goals- capping NWS nuclear weapons programs. Confirmation of one state’s large stocks of fissile materials could fuel domestic pressure in other competing or rival states to step up, not cap, those states nuclear activities.

e) The existing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards procedure may be inadequate to verify the commitments of the parties to the Treaty.

Nuclear testing and weapons proliferation in South Asia have been driven by India’s ambition to be treated equally to the five NWS, domestic political factors, and security concerns, including perceptions of China. The nuclear debate in Pakistan has been conducted more or less in the context of Pakistan’s security and national sovereignty. Since Pakistan cannot compete with India in conventional military power, it seeks to equalize India’s advantage with nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons that continue to place a considerable premium and caution when one nuclear power deals with another in matters either one or both consider vital to their respective national interests. Such caution fosters stability. It is the basic reason, due to which even after the end of Cold War, demise of former USSR and Warsaw Pact, the United States continues to maintain a nuclear deterrent both nationally and as a part of NATO. Therefore, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program aimed at nuclear deterrence against Indian conventional superiority and nuclear blackmail (i.e. the use of the threat to employ nuclear weapons as an instrument of coercive diplomacy). Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Potential Since the mid 1980s Pakistan had been considered a nuclear weapons capable state but India’s nuclear explosions on May 11 and 13, 1998 and its leaders’ wrong perceptions regarding the Pakistan’s nuclear weapons potential, left it no option, but to resort to nuclear weapons testing. Pakistan conducted a total of six nuclear explosions in its Chaghi hills. It used enriched Uranium (U-235) for those tests.

Sources: Umer Farooq, ‘Pakistan capable of building H. Bomb’, The Nation (Islamabad: June 1, 1998). ‘Fission technology has paved way for Hydrogen Bomb’, The Nation (Islamabad: June 1, 1998). Anwar Iqbal, ‘Pakistan tested boosted fission devices: Khan’, The News (Islamabad/ Rawalpindi: May 30, 1998). ‘Pakistan: The Other Shoe Drops’, The bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/August, 1998) pp. 24, 25.

The Pakistani scientists, who participated in May 1998 nuclear weapons tests, claimed that six nuclear weapons explosions provided them sufficient data about the nuclear weapons [11] . This data gives them confidence in existing (non-tested) designs and provides useful information for future nuclear weapons manufacturing. Pakistan possesses the capability due to May tests, to develop the following types of nuclear weapons:

The international community had contradicted the claim of Pakistani scientists about the success of six tests. According to US Pentagon sources, three of the five devices on the first day did not explode. Moreover, the analysis of the seismic data does not support the claims of Pakistani scientists. The average magnitude reported by the sixty-five stations recording the event on May 28 was 4.9, indicating an explosive yield in the 6 to 13 kiloton ranges. Fifty-one stations recorded the event on May 30, with an average magnitude of 4.3 indicating an explosion in the 2to8 kiloton range. Pentagon and Seismic records also testify that Pakistan faced design and engineering problems in its 3 tests on May 28, 1998. But they do not deny the reality that Pakistan posses tested nuclear weapons capability. It is because, Pakistan’s nuclear program is based on centrifugal technology or enriched uranium. The enrichment of the highly enriched uranium used in the Hiroshima bomb has never been publicly released. However, the enrichment technology used at that time could not enrich uranium over 80 percent. According to the knowledgeable individuals, the Hiroshima bomb contained roughly 70 percent enriched uranium. In fact according to the scientist highly enriched uranium (enriched to more than 20 percent in the isotope uranium 235) have been used in nuclear weapon. Therefore, even if we accept the pentagon and seismic calculation accurate, we are forced to accept the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.

Pakistan has maintained that the Treaty should go beyond mandating a cut-off of fissile material production and undertake the eradication of existing stockpiles. Pakistan along with the G-21 countries has argued that the FMCT should be a ‘nuclear disarmament measure and not just a non-proliferation measure’ [12] . Nevertheless, Pakistan’s security perception is largely influenced by the state of its relationship with India. Its hostile relations with India as well inferiority on conventional weapons increases Pakistan’s dependency on its nuclear weapons capabilities, Therefore, before Pakistan signs FMCT, it will carefully evaluate the pros and cons of its signing of the treaty. The discussion associated with the Pakistan’s signing of FMCT is based on the conclusion that if the FMCT come into force, all the parties to the Treaty would have to renounce further production of plutonium and stop enriching uranium to the level of weapons grade. And in case the production of such material is required for purposes other than weapons fabrication, it will have to be done under international safeguards. Moreover, one cannot take lightly the statements, such as, Norm Wulf from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) bureau for non-proliferation, ‘a key step in a multi-step process (the FMCT) that is hoped would eventually lead to a South Asia free of nuclear weapons’ [13] . In fact, one objective of the current US nonproliferation policy is to cap and eventually reverse the nuclear-weapon program of Pakistan. Significantly, the FMCT although considered to be a non-discriminatory disarmament measure, global in its reach and universal in its application, is so only in intent. In real terms, it does not change the status quo nor does it in any way reduce the gap between the haves and the have-nots. There is a big gap between India and Pakistan fissile material’s stockpiles.

Pakistan will not be pro-active and it follows the Indian policy on the FMCT. The decision of India will determine Pakistan’s course of action in the sphere of the FMCT. As long as, India does not support it, Pakistan will be silent on this issue at the international forums.This gives an impression that Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy, even after May 28 and 30, 1998 nuclear explosions, is too much influenced by the positions India takes. This enhances India's importance in the international community. The NWS and G-8 negotiate with India, the factors related with the Treaty. India will be in a better position to take advantages from the dialogue on the FMCT. Whereas Pakistan would be reducing itself to a non-negotiator, making zero leverage available to its negotiating diplomats. Pakistan would fail to exploit the situation in its favor.

Pakistan opts for an independent position by not explicitly linking its own policy of the FMCT to India. It would participate actively in the debates on the FMCT at the CD. Through participation, Pakistan would be able to lobby in the CD that ensures that the FMCT addresses existing stockpiles. In fact, Pakistan wants to achieve a nuclear equilibrium with India. Secondly, it would elevate Pakistan to the rank of a negotiating partner to the NWS and G-8 members. Thus Pakistan would be in a better position to plead the case in front of the international community and seek the advantages.

The current environment does not appear favorable for making a commitment that Pakistan should be the party of the FMCT. The new forms of arms race have been started. Involving not merely offensive weapons but also defensive weapons and countermeasures. India has been developing the missile defense systems by fusing the foreign and domestic research and missile components. It has been receiving foreign technology (covertly/overtly) for its missile defense project from the Russian Federation and Israel [14] . Pakistan cannot ignore these new developments in its long-term security plans. Therefore, it should wait and see, what will be the final draft of the Treaty, instead of taking decision before the finalization of the Treaty.

Pakistan should stay out of the FMCT debate, until it stockpiles sufficient quantity of fissile material. The Indian nuclear and missiles defense systems development would have great impact on Pakistan’s decision regarding the FMCT. In fact, the balance of conventional forces is in favor of India, and Pakistan counters it by nuclear deterrence. In the present scenario, the delicate balance power exited in South Asia. If Pakistan cap its fissile material production by signing the FMCT, the existing balance between both neighbors will be disturbed, because of the existence of unequal stockpiles of fissile material between India and Pakistan. The issue has become even more critical in the wake of India’s draft nuclear doctrine declaration. According to which it would develop and deploy triad of nuclear forces [15] . Moreover, India has been developing Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) System. The deployment of ABM system will undermine the nuclear deterrent of Pakistan and render it vulnerable to the offensive might of India. This vulnerability will compel Pakistan to enhance the size and sophistication of its nuclear arsenal. The modernization and increase of Pakistan’s missiles will require more weapon grade fissile material. Thus, it is not reasonable for Pakistan to give up its option for increasing its nuclear weapons number by supporting and signing the FMCT. The problem with this policy is that once India signs and ratifies the FMCT, Pakistan will inevitably face international isolation if it stay out of the Treaty. Consequently, it will have to face intense economic and political pressure. It can be painted as ‘nuclear rogue state’. Therefore, for practical reasons, the choice of saying no to the FMCT after India has signed it, is very costly.

The unilateral decision of Pakistan to sign the FMCT has negative as well as positive impact on Pakistan's nuclear policy. Since the nuclear tests, Pakistani leadership has argued that it is committed to avoiding the nuclear arms race in the region. And it has acclaimed that its objective is minimum nuclear deterrence. The membership of the FMCT will facilitate Pakistan in avoiding the development of over kill nuclear capabilities. However, before signing the treaty we have to make a careful look on our nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis security problems. There are certain technical problems associated with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability. Is the FMCT, the NPT in disguise? What are the implications of Safeguards regime? Will Pakistan is able to retain confidence in the reliability of its existing nuclear weapons capability (i.e. nuclear deterrence against India) under the Treaty? To what extent will the treaty constrain the development of new types of nuclear weapons by Pakistan? These are some questions, which needs more analysis.

The FMCT is the NPT in disguise, particularly in the sphere of international safeguards. Under the NPT, the NNWS have agreed to accept comprehensive safeguards, including extensive routine inspections and other monitoring by the IAEA, on all of their peaceful nuclear activities. By contrast, under the NPT, the NWS are not legally obligated to accept such international safeguards. Pakistan is not party to the NPT. Therefore, legally it is not bound to submit all its nuclear facilities to international safeguards. After signing the FMCT, it will have to surrender its sensitive nuclear facilities for international inspections. Although the Treaty would not deal with existing military stockpiles of Pakistan, it would put plutonium and HEU produced in the future in Pakistan, under full-scope international safeguards. This would have identical effect of the NPT in the sphere of IAEA safeguards. The IAEA safeguards would deter the diversion of plutonium and HEU for weapon purposes. In addition, it would provide an opportunity to our enemy to assess over nuclear facilities and undermine our security, by misusing the inspection clause.

In the prevalent strategic scenario, Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons capability, which provide it a minimum nuclear deterrence. The basis of this perception is that in nuclear deterrence, parity between opponents is not based on numerical equality of the number of nuclear delivery systems, or of the number of warheads or in the yield of megatons available to each opponent. Parity requires assured destruction capability [16] . Nuclear deterrence is a dynamic concept, which requires constant vigilance to detect and counteract destabilising developments. Moreover, a nuclear balance is achieved when each side, after absorbing pre-emptive strike, has a second-strike force able to inflict unacceptable damage on adversary. Pakistan’s geographical narrowness or lack of strategic depth and the Indians’ commitment to introduce more sophisticated nuclear capable delivery system like cruise missiles and ballistic missile defence system, and aerial surveillance systems [17] , pose serious challenges to the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence. Therefore, the caution against relying on forces that are too small is obvious. In fact, small forces would presumably be easier to destroy in a first strike and therefore would have less credibility as a deterrent because the surviving forces might not be able to retaliate. In the nuclear balance, there is safety in numbers. With sizeable forces on both sides, the attacker cannot be certain of a successful first strike [18] . According to the published sources Pakistan’s fissile material production facilities have capacity to produce material for two to three nuclear weapons per year. The existing stockpile would enable it to produce twenty-five to forty nuclear weapons, enough for a small minimum deterrence force [19] , provided the existing balance of power between India and Pakistan should not change. Otherwise Pakistan has to increase drastically the numerical strength of its nuclear weapons for the sustainability and durability of its credible nuclear deterrence. Thus it has to keep open, its option for the production of fissile material.

The FMCT has aim of establishing a new international norm- that of ending the production of Plutonium and enriched Uranium for weapon purposes. It is another step to maintain the monopoly of a few states over nuclear weapons. It is a mere nuclear non-proliferation measure and not a nuclear disarmament treaty. Comparing the situation in all eight states with nuclear weapon programs, it is evident that we are faced with a paradox, the smaller the stocks, the greater they are political sensitive. The Treaty would effect Pakistan, India and Israel more than the remaining five NWS. What needs to be done, keeping in view the existing strategic reality in the South Asian region, the disparity in fissile material stockpiles between India and Pakistan and the probability that strategic environment can be changed in near future. Pakistan, therefore, before taking any decision, should carefully evaluate the implications of the status and content of the safeguards, the scope of international verifications, the duration of the Treaty, the right of withdrawal, the amendment procedure, and what countries adherence should be considered critical for eventual entry-into-force of the FMCT.Pakistan is committed to achieve a credible nuclear deterrence, with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons, consistent with its national security needs. But what it requires for minimum credible deterrence vis-à-vis India is not easy to quantify in concrete terms. India has been developing and procuring large numbers of different weapons. These weapons would alter the existing delicate strategic equilibrium between India and Pakistan. Pakistan would be forced to review its strategic policies, in order to address the new security challenges. The review entails the development of more sophistical nuclear weapons, which require more fissile material. Whereas, the FMCT would freeze the fissile material stockpiles in Pakistan’s disadvantage. Hence, it is quite obvious that making any commitment with the international community regarding the FMCT, in its present form, does not serve the strategic interest of Pakistan.

§ Zafar Nawaz is a research fellow at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Islamabad.

[1] The resolution 48/75-L was adopted without a vote. See Ambassador Robert T. Grey JR., US representative to the Conference on Disarmament Geneva, ‘US Urges Disarmament Conference to Launch Fissile Material Talk’ (February 15, 2001). http:// www. fas. org/nuke/control/fmct/news/treaty-fmct-010215.htm.

[2] Some scholars believe that since 1989, a trend to non-proliferation emerged, that is elimination of the nuclear threat by scaling down and eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons. But the nuclear policies of nuclear weapon states oppose that trend. See Professor William Walker, ‘Irreversibility, the Cut-off Treaty and Fissile Material Stocks’ Presentation given at a Workshop sponsored by the Institute for Science and International Security (Geneva, April 27, 1998. http// www.isis-online.org/ publications/npt/walker.htm. See also Sharif M. Shuja, ‘India’s Nuclear Bomb and the Non-Proliferation Regimes’, South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, and Vol.23, No.3 (Spring 2000). See also Brad Robert, Robert A. Manning, and Ronald N. Montaperto, ‘China: The Forgotten Nuclear Power’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.79, No.4 (July/ August 2000) pp. 53-63.

[3] The deployment of US BMD system will undermine the various arms control treaties and disarmament agreements that are in place. For instance the 1972 ABM Treaty, the START process, etc. On July 16, 2001,President Vladimir Putin said in an interview that if the Americans break the rules of the ABM agreement, Russia would have the right to consider the START-1 and START-2 treaties no longer valid. Beijing regards the BMD system plan as a challenge to its own nuclear deterrent. Therefore, it would lead China to initiate a major buildup of its nuclear forces. See Brad Robert, Robert A. Manning, and Ronald N. Montaperto, Opcit. p.54. See also Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ‘US BMD: Leading to a New Era of Arms Race?’ Strategic Studies, Vol. XXI, No.1 (Islamabad: Spring 2001) pp.43-64. See ‘Russia to rearm if ABM goes’, The News (Islamabad/ Rawalpindi: July 17, 2001) p.25.0

[4] In October1999, the US Senate refused to ratify it. India, Pakistan and North Korea have not even signed it. Article 14 of the CTBT requires that this Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of the instrument of ratification by all states listed in Annex 2 to this Treaty. US, India, Pakistan and North Korea are included in that list.

[5] The nuclear non-proliferation regime is an integrated network of treaties and other standard-setting arrangements, which provide a comprehensive framework for the behavior of states, and international organizations and other actors, in the nuclear area. See John Simpson and Darryl Howlett, ‘The NPT Renewal Conference Stumbling toward 1995’, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1(Summer 1994) pp. 43-44.

[6] Munir Akram, Ambassador of Pakistan 'Fissile Material Treaty', Statement at the Conference on Disarmament (August 11, 1998).

[7] Samina Ahmad, ‘Pakistan’s Proposal for a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South Asia’, Pakistan Horizon, Vol. XXXII, No. 4 (Karachi: 1979) pp. 92-130. See also Ashley J. Tellis, ‘Stability in South Asia’ RAND Report, (US: Arroyocenter, 1997) p. 42.

[8] See Ambassador Robert T. Grey Jr. op.cit.

[9] Afzal Mahmood, ‘Pakistan’s stance on FMCT’ Dawn (January 12, 1999).

[10] George Bunn, ‘Options for Cut-off or Fissile Material Treaty’, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/fmct/bunn.html.

[11] ‘CTBT not to effect N-Programme: Dr. Qadeer’, Muslim (Islamabad: September 15, 1998).

[12] Dr. Rifaat Hussain, ‘Prospects for Peace between India and Pakistan’, National Development And Security’, Vol. ix, No. 3, Serial No. 35 (Rawalpindi: Spring 2001) p.14.

[13] ‘Fissile Material Ban Gains Supports But Still Seeks Mandate’, Arms Control Today ( May 1994) p. 17

[14] India has been developing a Theater Missile Defence (TMD), with the assistance of Russia and Israel. India’s has also buying these missiles from the friendly states. Fore example, Israel is transferring its Arrow- Anti-tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM) and Phalcon- Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft. India is also developing an AEW platform equipped with phased array radar technology, similar to be used by Phalcon, to cue its ATBM system. See Gregory Koblentz, ‘Theater Missile Defense and South Asia: A Volatile Mix’, The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring/Summer 1997) pp. 52 to 62. See also Vladimir Radyuhin, ‘Fernandes in Moscow for talks on defence ties’ The Hindu(New Delhi: June22,2000. For details about India’s missile potential see also Zafar Nawaz Jaspal ‘India’s Missiles Capabilities: Regional Implications’. National Development and Security, Vol. IX, No. 3, Serial No. 35 (Spring 2001). pp 39-73.

[15] See the Draft of India’s Nuclear Doctrine.

[16] David Langford, “War in 2080 - The Future of Military Technology”: (UK: Washington Books, 1979), pp. 5.

[17] The Indian Air force acquired two Russian A-50 AWAC aircraft for radar, electronic surveillance, photoreconnaissance and spying. See Air Marshal (Retd.) Ayaz Ahmad Khan, ‘Indian AWACs threaten Pakistan air space’, Defence Journal (July 2000) pp.35-37.

[18] John Spanier, Games Nations Play- Seventh Edition (Washington D. C., A Division of Congressional Quartely Inc., 1990) p355.

[19] Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Use Doctrine and Command and Control’ in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (US: Cornell University Press, 2000)p 165.