Fencing the Afghan border

The POST, Sun, January,07, 2007.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema

After absorbing an almost continuous barrage of accusations by the Afghan regime that Pakistan is not stopping the cross border infiltration of Talibans and their sympathizers, the government of Pakistan announced on 26^th December that it has decided to selectively mine and fence the Pak-Afghan border. Explaining the need for such a decision the Interior Minister Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao stated that this was not only the last resort measure but the intentions are to demonstrate to those who accuse Pakistan for not doing enough to plug the alleged infiltrations that Pakistan is willing and determined to undertake all feasible measures to control the cross border activities. In this connection he also mentioned that Pakistan has already stationed 80,000 troops and established over 800 check points on the border.

Justifying the decision, the foreign secretary stressed that the move is primarily meant to reflect Pakistan’s commitment that its territory would not be used for militancy inside Afghanistan. He highlighted the extraordinary nature of the situation which, according to him required extraordinary measures. He also cited examples of US-Mexico border to check the cross border movement. Responding to a question whether or not Pakistan would be seeking the help of international community in this regard, the foreign secretary identified the issue of Afghan refugees’ repatriation in which the international community could really help in terms of funding and innovative initiatives.

The announcement of Pakistani decision to fence and mine the border has invoked reactions and has started a lively debate regarding its efficacy, feasibility, practicality and utility. Perhaps one way to assess and judge the merits and implications is to identify the concerns of all directly involved parties. Let us first look at the reasons why Pakistan has taken this decision. According to Pakistani sources it has taken many measures to prevent the alleged cross border movement but neither the foreign forces in Afghanistan nor the Afghan government acknowledges its concerted efforts. On the contrary they keep blaming Pakistan for not doing enough. In many ways the blame game has pushed the Pakistani authorities to seriously consider measures like fencing and mining the border.

The Afghans and their foreign friends rarely target the real problem areas which includes inability of the Afghan government to eliminate the rampart corruption, controlling the booming drug trade, curtailing the influence of drug barons on various stakeholders, strengthening the state institutions, reducing dependency upon large number of foreign forces and preventing their indulgence in killing of innocent civilians,  inducing the donors to live up to their commitments, accelerating the reconstruction process, effectively checking the rising influence of India, arresting the rapidly deteriorating law and order situation, controlling the activities of the war lords and preventing the rapid resurgence of Talibans etc.

The main focus of the Kabul government is not to treat seriously the above mentioned issues but to shift the spotlight from internal dynamics to putting the blame on Pakistan. This approach is no different than what some Pakistanis used to employ in early phase of Pakistan’s independent existence. Whenever they were unable to tackle the problems confronting them adequately, they used to put the blame on the Englishmen. Later they matured and realized that the Englishmen have gone and even if they have left some issues unresolved, it is the duty of those confronting the issue or problem to find a way out rather than postponed the issue by employing the blame game technique. The tactic of blame game can only buy some time but does not help in solving the problem.

The Kabul government believes that the Taliban enjoy sanctuaries in Pakistani tribal areas where they not only impart training but also use the territory for attacking the Afghan forces and their friends. This is precisely what the government of Pakistan is trying to prevent and deny the sanctuaries to Talibans. The Pakistanis have categorically and repeatedly stated that they will not allow the use of their territory for incursions into Afghanistan. In this connection the erection of fence and mining on selective basis makes sense. What does not make sense is the Afghan government’s reactive objection to such a move. On the contrary they should have appreciated the move and suggest some other measures which they deem appropriate and would further strengthen the policy pursuit.

The Afghan reaction amounts to nothing more than as someone has taken away the frequently employed excuse. However the Afghan government regards not only the fencing and mining plan as an impractical pursuit but also believes that it would not check the intensification of Taliban insurgency. All measures aimed to deny sanctuaries and effectively check infiltrations need to be supported by both governments. The Afghan President also stated that this move would divide the Pakhtoons straddling both sides of the border. A similar argument was advanced by Amir Abdur Rehman when he negotiated the Durand Treaty in 1893 but he was eventually satisfied with the then agreed border. More than 113 years have passed and the tribesmen have learned to live on both sides of border, how can the fencing of the already agreed border cause any further division.

Compared to Afghan reaction, the UN reaction seems more logical. The UN official expressed their disapproval of Pakistan’s plan to mine parts of its border with Afghanistan stressing that it would add to civilian casualties in a region that has already suffered enough because of the Soviet mines littered all over the country. Besides, the UN is opposed to the use of mines.  Admittedly Pakistan did not sign the Ottawa Convention on landmines but there is no doubt that mines on the border could cause civilian causalities unnecessarily especially in the light of the fact that the border is inhabited by the Pakhtoon tribesmen who frequently and freely cross the border under the ‘easement rights’ clause of the Durand Line agreement of 1893. Pakistan has categorically stated that it will continue to respect the ‘easement clause’ which allows cross border social and commercial interaction for the tribes in the border areas. Fencing and mining is intended to be carried out on selective basis.

Critics have also tried to highlight the impracticality of the project. It needs to be mentioned here that the fencing and mining of the border is to be undertaken only in selected and troubled areas. Some have even projected the idea as a mere wishful thinking. Whether or not the fence is actually erected and parts of the border is mined remains to be seen but one thing appears to be certain that the government of Pakistan is determined to deny the Talibans their sanctuaries on Pakistani soil. The Pakistan army has already been asked to prepare the plan deemed necessary for identifying areas that are viewed as problematic and appropriate for fencing and mining.  

Undoubtedly the Pakistanis have been pushed to undertake measures like fencing and mining of the border by the Afghan regime. It is still not too late to avoid such drastic measures and alternatives approaches could be found through a dialogue process. But this clearly implies that the policy of blame game need to be totally discarded and collaborative approach need to be adopted and given top priority. There is no doubt in my mind that not only all Pakistanis are keen to see a stable and peaceful Afghanistan but the government of Pakistan has also been continuously working for a stable, peaceful and friendly Afghanistan.

The writer works for Islamabad Policy research Institute.