Expansion of Indian defence budget

Pakistan OBSERVER, Tue, Mar,04, 2008.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema
 

Reports published in a leading Pakistani newspaper recently revealed that India is planning to raise its defense allocations by 8 to 10 per cent in this year’s budget. It is also assessed that this amount may not please the Indian armed forces but it is viewed by many as enough for gradual modernization of world’s fourth largest military.

Undoubtedly India is emerging as one of world biggest arms buyers and is also planning one of its biggest ever arms purchases, a $10 billion deal to buy 126 fighter jets. However the intended increase is justified to meet the inflation impact and is not viewed as substantial by the military analysts in India. ‘We are falling short of the required budgetary support which does not augur well’ said the Director of New Delhi’s Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses.

It needs to be mentioned here that India raised its defense budget by 7.8 per cent to $22 billion last year which would end in March 2008 as part of the plan to modernize its 1.3 million strong military. Added increase would not only cover the inflationary toll but would provide substantive amount for the continuation of modernization drive. Not only such an amount would entice many leading arms suppliers but would also generate fears for those continuously living under the shadow of rapidly increasing might of the Indian military.

Compared to Pakistan’s total defense expenditure which was $4.14 billion US dollars in 2006 and for the current year is $4.53 billion US dollars, the Indian defense budget was $22.46 billion US dollars in 2006 and the currently it is $28.5 US dollars. The proposed increase would indeed raise alarms among all those countries which are not just apprehensive of Indian future designs but have already suffered significantly at the hands of the Indians.

One of the important pre-requisites to analyze any country’s defense problems is the identification of threats emanating either from external or internal sources. The operative military doctrine and the existing force posture are often designed to meet the perceived threats despite the unresolved controversy whether the doctrine guides the evolution of force posture or whether the converse is true.

The primary function of a military doctrine is to maximize the effectiveness of a state’s military capabilities in support of national objectives. Not only the national strategic objectives are invariably devised the country’s ruling elite in consultation with the civil and military bureaucracies in almost all the third world countries, but interpreting threats to the security is also their prerogative.

To acquire desired level of military preparedness, the defense planner often begins with the evaluation of manner and intensity of the perceived threats. A comprehensive dossier on actual and potential adversaries is prepared highlighting the adversary’s capabilities and intensions. The justification for a certain level of resources-allocation is directly linked with the agreed force posture and its accompanying weapon system.

There is no doubt that the high level of influence which the armed forces enjoy in some countries often contributes towards the increased allocation. In addition, there are countries that have ambitious agenda also manage to secure regular increases in their defense budgets. Yet another factor that has contributed towards regular increase in defense budgets is the existence and influence of military industrial complex.

The armed forces both in India and Pakistan enjoy considerable influence over the decision making processes. Compared to India, Pakistan has also remained under military rule. However this does not mean that the Indian armed forces do not enjoy considerable influence over the political decision making in India. Ever since the India-Pakistan peace process started things were moving relatively lesser pace than what was expected initially.

The recent phase has witnessed even more slowing down of the process and increased influence of Indian armed forces in the dispute resolution mechanism. For example the dispute over Siachin was nearly resolved in 1989 but the announcement of agreement was postponed because of political reasons as Rajive Gandhi, who was then the incumbent Prime Minister, got scared of the fact that the agreement may cost him votes. Consequently the resolution was put on the hold until the advent of a more favorable climate.

Since the successful conclusion of 12th SAARC submits in Jan. 2004, not only the relations between India and Pakistan have been gradually improving but the overall atmosphere has vastly improved. Given the past history, the prevalent atmosphere has never been as good as it is today yet one finds the injection of frivolous notions and creation of undesired impediments.

After the passage of three successful years of peace process everybody was expecting the resolution of the least complex dispute like the one on Siachin yet in the fourth round of peace process the resolution was Siachin was effectively impeded by the Indian armed forces.
The politically bosses easily gave in to the demands put by the military leaders in India and the resolution of Siachin was once again put on the hold.

Many Indian analysts invariably project that the total defense allocation is around 2.5 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP) whereas is Pakistan’s allocation is around 4 percent. It is obvious that percentage of defense allocation in larger economy would be less. Japan GDP in 2007 was 4.65 trillion US dollars whereas India and Pakistan GDP in 2007 were 1.209 billion and 144 billion US dollars respectively.

Given the regular increases in the Indian defense budgets and non-resolution of main India-Pakistan disputes tend to generate pressures on Pakistan and it would not be surprising to see the emergence voices stressing the need to increase allocation to defense sector in order maintain minimal requisite level to ward of Indian threats.

What the Indian planners need to realize that the increased gap in conventional capabilities would not only inevitably generate sufficient pressures on the Pakistani decision makers to allocate more at the cost of development but would also reduce the time span from conventional to nuclear. A large gap between two countries conventional capabilities could push Pakistan to rely rather heavily upon its nuclear capability.

Admittedly India is viewing itself a global player and is preparing itself for envisaged role but what it should realize is that more acquisition of sophisticated weaponry might make its neighbors insecure. It is imperative for the Indians to at least pay some respect to their neighbor’s sense of insecurity. One way out of this quagmire is to quickly resolution the dispute that has bedeviled relationships with their neighbors.

The writer works for Islamabad Policy research Institute.