Erosion of the Non-Proliferation Regime
The POST,
Sun, October,29, 2006.
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema
Disappointed over their inability to prevent the North Korean
test, many in the West are now looking at the erosion of the NPT
(Non-Proliferation Treaty) and the NPR (Non-Proliferation Regime) with some
skepticism and realism. However they are still far from being truly realistic
in their outlook. They have not yet learnt to recognize and acknowledge their
own efforts which had actually started the process of erosion.
NPR is a network of treaties, unilateral,
bilateral and multilateral undertakings and inspection aimed at halting the
spread of WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction-nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons). It is a mechanism to control and prevent the spread of WMD. Among
the elements of control mechanism, NPT is viewed as perhaps the most important
one. The NPT was signed in 1968 and came into force in 1970.
The NPT divides member’s countries into
nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states. Nuclear weapons states are defined by
the treaty as countries which detonated a nuclear explosion prior to January
1, 1967. By this definition only five states qualified to be viewed as nuclear
weapon states. These are the US (which detonated in 1945), the Soviet Union
(1949), United Kingdom (1952), France (1960) and China (1964). With the
exception of India, Israel, Pakistan and Cuba almost all countries signed the
NPT. Originally the treaty was signed only for 25 years with a periodic review
after every five years. In 1995 Review Conference the members agreed to extend
the agreement indefinitely.
The NPT signatories are expected not to
manufacture or receive nuclear explosives and to accept the IAEA safeguards on
all nuclear activities- an arrangement known as full-scope safeguards. In the
NPT review conference of 2000, the participants also agreed to a program of
action which included series of practical steps to make the NPT more
effective. Perhaps the most important measures included in the program of
action were further unilateral reduction in nuclear arsenal, increased
transparency of nuclear weapon states’ nuclear capabilities, further reduction
in non-strategic nuclear weapon stockpiles, diminishing role for nuclear
weapons in security policies, a moratorium on nuclear testing pending the
entry into force of the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) etc.
Undoubtedly the NPT established a code of
international behavior in the nuclear field. Despite the inbuilt asymmetry of
rights and obligations for the nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states,
by 2002 almost every state joined the NPT system except Cuba, India, Israel
and Pakistan. In 1998 both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests which,
according to some writers, dealt an unwanted blow to the NPR. Another major
blow to the NPR was administered by the US when its Senate rejected the CTBT
in 1999. The latest blow to the NPR was struck by North Korean when it
conducted its nuclear test recently.
President Bush in his state of union address
in 2002 categorically stressed that he would not allow world’s most dangerous
regimes to acquire nuclear weapons. It appears that reference was made to
Iraq, Iran and North Korea. The Americans invaded Iraq on the pretext that
Iraq was engaged in acquiring the WMD but found no evidence. He has also been
pressurizing the Iranians to dissuade them from their pronounced drift towards
uranium enrichment. And now North Korea has conducted a nuclear test to the
intense dislike of the Americans who appeared to be currently engaged on
imposing punitive measures against the North Koreans.
In each of the above mentioned cases what
appears to be a common element revolves around American policy pursuits in
particular and western approaches in general. Two aspects of these approaches
are somewhat pronounced; the double standards and issuance of threats and
punitive measures. A review of almost all cases which have weakened the NPR
clearly reflects the double standards adopted by many western countries. In
the case of Indian nuclear pursuits most western nation refrained from
applying pressures which they readily applied to Iraq, Iran and now to North
Korea. Perhaps the most ludicrous explanation advanced by a western country
was that they were caught unaware. Were they really? The most plausible
explanation is that they looked the other way intentionally. How a country
that operates snoopy satellites 24hour was unable to detect the impending
nuclear test by the Indians.
Similarly invasion of Iraq was not caused by
the alleged presence of WMD on Iraqi soil but by other considerations which
included the regime change, control over oil wells and strengthening of Israel
by destroying the Iraqi military might etc. Iran is being subjected to
systematic pressurization to abandon the course it has adopted. Despite Iran’s
rational pleas, one does not hear of any construction move. Since Israel
enjoys massive influence over the American policy formulation processes and it
feels that a nuclear Iran would be a great threat to its security, it is
expected that the US will continue with its current policy pursuit.
The second significant element of the
western policy pursuits and more specifically that of the US is heavy reliance
on punitive aspects. The threat to inflict punishment appears to have become
an integral part of the western policy pursuits especially after the tragic
events of 9/11. Invariably the sane elements within those entrusted with the
task of strengthening the NPR stresses for diplomatic and politically
approaches, one finds the hardliners often carry the day especially if the
target state is the non-western country.
In 1960 President Kennedy predicted that
within a decade there would be 25 nuclear weapon states. After more than five
and half decade there are only nine. Admittedly there are many aspirants but
the actual nuclear weapon states are US, UK, France, Russia, China, Israel,
India, Pakistan and North Korea. The western nuclear Pundits, in their usual
way, are painting a doomsday scenario and are now predicting that both South
Korea and Japan could think of acquiring nuclear weapons. Similarly many of
the western nuclear experts are stressing that if Iran acquire the bomb, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, Syria and Egypt would follow the suit. Whether or not these
countries are thinking on those lines, one thing is certain that the western
Pundits are injecting such ideas to lend strength to their doomsday obsession.
Although the western Pundits are approaching
the whole issue not just by waving punitive swords and demonstrating their
discriminatory approaches, the real issue is not yet subjected to thorough
investigation. The most important question is why do nations want nuclear
weapons capability? Undoubtedly it is either for augmentation of power or
survival. The NPR does not address the security question adequately. Apart
from a reference to the obligations of all member states under the UN Charter
to refrain in their international relations from threat or use of force, no
special or specific obligations are part of the NPT to ensure the security of
the non-nuclear weapon state. The question that is often asked in non-western
world is what have the international community done with regard to the much
desired resolution of the Kashmir dispute or Palestine question.
Just as the detailed analysis clearly
indicated that it was the sense of insecurity which forced Pakistan to opt for
nuclear weapons, it is not difficult to assume that in both cases of North
Korea and Iran the element of insecurity may have been pushing them on their
chosen path. Would it not be rational to alleviate their fears and remove the
increasing level of their sense of insecurity? Instead of issuing punitive
threats, a much more productive approach entails diplomatic engagements.
Invariably the issuance of punitive threat has resulted in hardening of
stances of the target states which eventually lead to further deterioration of
situation. Perhaps the best way out of the present impasse is to activate six
party talks with North Korea.
The writer works for Islamabad Policy research Institute.
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