Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema

Washington's decision to unilaterally withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty has invoked strong reactions and initiated a lively debate. Not only the move itself signals an end of the current efforts to further subject the nuclear genie to arms control measures but it also injects a dose of uncertainty to the existing complex network of measures and treaties aimed to make this world more safer.

The ABM Treaty is viewed as one of the earliest arms control success story. The treaty was signed on 26th May 1972 between the US and the Soviet Union and entered into force in October. After the arrival of an Amended Protocol in 1974 it remained in force until recently. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the state of Russia became the legal successor to the Soviet Union.

According to the treaty both the US and Russia are committed not to undertake to build a nation-wide defence system against strategic ballistic missile attack and impressively limited the development and deployment of permitted missile defences. An authoritative source explained that the treaty ' prohibits the two parties from giving air defence missiles, radars or launchers the technical capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or from testing them in a strategic ABM mode'. The 1974 Amended Protocol permitted ABM deployment to one site with no more than 100 ABM fixed launcher and 100 ABM single warhead interceptor missiles. The treaty permits the early warning radars.

The underneath logic of ABM treaty was to restrict the missile defences of both sides with a view to leave them vulnerable to retaliatory nuclear strikes and thus ensure and codify the strategic mutual assured destruction capability. The assumption was that denying both the desired missile defences would facilitate curbing the race to develop even more deadly offensive weapons and discourage the potential first striker because that would lead to massive nuclear retaliation. Deterrence was deemed to be more effective if both sides left their cities unshielded so that they can serve as potential
hostages.

The ABM treaty was a subject of heated debates both within the US and between the Soviet Union and the US through out the 80s. The Reagan Administration promoted the notion of SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative), which generated an interesting debate, but it petered out with the advent of the 90s. With the departure of the Cold war and the proliferation of missile technology the emphasis seemed to have shifted to the theatre missile defence (TMD). A new debate was initiated over the efficacy of TMD. Some analysts even claimed that the new advanced TMD would have the capability of intercepting strategic missiles and allowing their deployment would amount to a major loophole in ABM treaty.

The Clinton Administration decided to launch a major effort to provide the US and its close allies with an effective TMD capability. Since the TMD are not formally included in the ABM treaty, Clinton Administration announced in 1995 that US would proceed with the testing of sophisticated long-range TMD systems. Consequently the budgetary allocation was increased. One major influencing factor causing the accelerated efforts for TMD was the missile proliferation. The then US authorities projected that by the year 2000 around 20 to 25 countries would have missiles. The American apprehensions focused more on their perceptions of potential adversaries' likely acquisition of missiles.

Periodic efforts to further strengthen one's own defences manifested in one form or the other. To promote what is often referred 'technology-readiness programme' is not an unusual pursuit. The rich and technologically advanced countries invariably tread the hitherto unknown or relatively less explored areas. Not only the Americans were trying to make their homeland even safer but they were also engaged in providing hedge against unexpected developments to their allies. One interpretation of current Republican efforts to ditch ABM treaty revolves around that it is being done by carefully prepared designs with a view to please certain active lobbies. The powerful military industrial complex could be one major source exerting pressures on the incumbent administration.

While it is not too difficult to comprehend American compulsions causing improvement in their defensively orientated system, the issue that needs to be focused is that such efforts should not adversely impact on the existing arms control measures and also not make the others insecure and unsure of their defensive systems. If the adversaries begin to feel insecure, the chances for a new arms race would inevitably increase.

Regretting the America decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty, Mr.Kofi Annan has already expressed fears of a new arms race. Similarly many other nations have supported the contention that such a step is likely to pave the way for renewed arms race. For years the ABM treaty has served as a cornerstone of maintaining international peace and security and strategic stability. Abandoning the treaty, asserted Mr. Annan would not only provoke an arms race especially in the missile area but would also undermine disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.

The American decision also invoked strong reactions from the Russians. While acknowledging American right to withdraw from the treaty, the Russians Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov stressed during his visit to Brazil recently that such decision would be a cause for annoyance. Lacking impressive economic strides that could demonstrate Russia's economic recovery along with increasing domestic criticism against the incumbent Russian leadership as being too pliable to American moves, the unilateral withdrawal could be interpreted as American efforts to keep Russia under continuous pressure. Similarly the Chinese also expressed their concerns. Not only China does not favour the anticipated acquisition of a missile defence system but it also highlighted the dangers that would accrue from the damaged strategic equilibrium.

The US withdrawal from the ABM treaty could have adverse impact in five areas. First, the Chinese has often explained as that the introduction of missile defence system would irreparably harm the existing international strategic balance. Many countries would be forced to review their defence policies in order to accommodate the new realities. The altered strategic equilibrium could give birth to many unforeseen complex problems.
Beijing fears that they may be forced to develop more and more sophisticated weapons.

Second, one of the major reason contributing towards the American decision is the proliferation of missile technology but the question that requires probing is whether or not the withdrawal would arrest the missile proliferation. The obvious answer is that the withdrawal is unlikely to check the ongoing missile proliferation. Perhaps a better way is to introduce more stringent arms control measures specifically designed to exert international control over the missiles technology. It needs to be mentioned here that non of the new owners of missile technology really possess intercontinental ballistic missiles that could threaten American homeland with the exception of India which has very large missile development programme including intercontinental ballistic missiles like Agni series.

Third, since the American withdrawal from ABM treaty is viewed as a major blow to a very important arms control measure, the anticipated danger is that it might start a dangerous trend. It would indeed set a bad precedent, which, in turn, could erode the very basis of the arms control regimes. The withdrawal from NPT (Non-proliferation Treaty) may become far more real than what was the case in the past. Similarly measures like START could be thrown to winds. Already the CTBT and the UN efforts to curb small arms proliferation are not making the desired progress. The withdrawal from ABM treaty could strengthen opposition to other arms control measures.

Fourth, as has already been mentioned by many including the Secretary General of the UN that the very act of withdrawal from ABM treaty could start a renewed arms race. This also means that the defence budgets that were witnessed to be on the decline would reverse the trend and demonstrate once again an upward trend. The post-Cold War era witnessed a reduction trend in the defence budgets. Apart from few exceptions the general trend was to cut down the allocations to defence sector. With the possibility of a new arms race the defence budgets are likely to attract more resource allocations.

The fifth area, which would be directly affected by the American decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty, is the regional equations. The introduction of NMD or TMD would force the Chinese to reconsider its defence policy and devise new one in congruence with the dictates of the existing situation created by American policies. The Chinese efforts to strengthen its defence would invoke somewhat similar reaction among the Indians and they would also opt for more acquisitions of relevant weapons along with early warning systems and missile shield. The Indian attempts to bolster their defence systems would compel Pakistan to undertake measures that would make it safe from Indian adventurism.