The Baglihar Setback

Pakistan OBSERVER, Thu, January,13, 2005.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema


The inability of both India and Pakistan to resolve the Baglihar Dam despite the fact many news reports indicated that the differences have been narrowed down certainly is a setback to the ongoing peace process. There is no doubt that each failure tends to not only dampen hopes that may have been exaggeratedly raised but also takes a toll of the incumbent enthusiasm and goodwill. To reach some understanding both sides agreed to extend talks for another day with the hope that they may be able to work out their differences but failed to do so.

The construction on the Baglihar dam project on the river Chenab started in 1999 though it was conceived and approved much earlier. In order to quickly complete the project the Indians have currently employed several hundreds of engineers and the labourers. The recent reports indicate that they have hired the services of many more individuals to speed up the construction work with ostensible aim of confronting Pakistan with a fait accompli.

The Pakistanis had conveyed their objections and reservation regarding the design of the project despite the fact that the requested requisite data was never supplied quickly. According to the Indus water treaty of 1960, the unrestricted flow of Chenab waters was allocated to Pakistan. However it needs to be mentioned here that India was allowed the use of limited waters of western rivers for development of irrigation, generation of electric power along with other uses that were spelled out in the annexes of the treaty.

Pakistan’s objection and reservations about the project primarily deals with the design which allows more flow of waters than what is permissible under the Indus water treaty. On learning about the construction the Pakistanis raised their objections which India, tried to ignore initially but later began to respond somewhat hesitantly. Even the Pakistanis were allowed to visit the site. After the visit the Pakistanis became even more convinced that if the dam is constructed in accordance with the current design, Pakistan is likely to lose 7000 to 8000 cusecs a day. This implies that Pakistan will have to learn to live with these losses.

Cognizant of the likely losses the Pakistanis initially tried to have the necessary rectification of design done at the Indus Commissioners level but once they were unable to secure a desired agreement, the dispute-level was raised to the level of secretaries of water and power. The two sides have met but have so far not been able to work out a mutually acceptable agreement. In the recent meeting of the secretaries the Pakistanis have listed six objections relating to pondage level, spillways, level of intake tunnels, regulatory weir level, height of gates and elevation of tunnels etc.

To address Pakistani reservations and objections the recent talks which were originally scheduled for two days, were extended for another day. In many ways it was a last ditch effort on the part of the Pakistanis to secure the desired rectification. While the Indians are generating the impression that they are considering all the Pakistani objections and reservations rather seriously and they wanted Pakistanis to continue bilateral talks, the Pakistani stance, as reported in the section of Pakistani press, was that the ‘talks could be continued only if India stopped work on the dam’. India did not agree to this condition and have opted for continuation of construction which is not acceptable to the Pakistanis.

The question that needs to be addressed here is that why did the Indian refuse to stop the construction work in order to have another round of bilateral talks and opted to carry on with their hard approach? Many reasons account for such pursuits. First, it appears that Indian believe that construction should not only continue but work should be speeded up with a view to present the Pakistanis with a fait accompli. Since the over prevailing atmosphere has considerably improved, the Pakistanis could be brought around to accept the Indian interpretation once the construction is complete. Incentive or concessions in some other areas might be employed at the time of presenting the fait-accompli.

The second interpretation is that India apparently believes that it can get away with its own interpretation and the international community is unlikely to put sufficient pressures forcing her to change. The lure of large market can influence the policy pursuits of many nations. If Israel can get away and continue to pursue its policy of construction of wall despite the verdict of world court, India could do the same especially when one realises that wall issue is far more important than the modification of dam’s design. Given the world after 9/11 it would not be all that surprising if India ignores the international pressures and effectively bypasses its commitments.

The third interpretation that comes to ones mind is viewing it as a minor disrespect to the obligations of the Indus Water treaty. If India can brush aside openly the UN resolutions on the ongoing Kashmir dispute, the design issue could be viewed as minor by many Indian officials. A close scrutiny of the Indian policy pursuits especially its Kashmir policy clearly points towards such a probability.

Given the above mentioned situation what can and what should Pakistan do. Perhaps the only way out for Pakistan is to take the case to the World Bank in accordance with the provisions of the treaty and seek the appointment of a neutral expert. India has always opposed the involvement of a third party in any of its dispute. It prefers to handle them on bilateral basis. Undoubtedly the bilateral tackling of the mutual dispute is perhaps one the best way to resolve issues but what happens if the two parties reach a dead-end. In such a situation it would be appropriate to involve the third party.

After the failure of current round of talks the Pakistani delegation came back to Pakistan. Now the next appropriate stage is to approach the World Bank and secure the appointment of a neutral expert. The decision to move to the next stage in its efforts to resolve the dispute in accordance with the provisions of Indus Waters treaty has been announced by the Pakistani Prime Minister who has directed the concerned quarters to make necessary preparation on priority basis for seeking World Bank arbitration.  It is pertinent to mention here that Pakistanis, in the past, had already stated that they would move the case to the World Bank if the bilateral negotiation failed.         

Judged by any yardstick the failure to reach an agreement over the Baglihar dam is bound to take not only a heavy chunk of existing goodwill and cordiality of atmosphere but would also strengthen the belief that India is employing age old delaying tactics.  Whether or not this failure would adversely impact upon the ongoing composite dialogue remains to be seen but there is no doubt it would certainly dampen the existing optimism.

The author works for Islamabad Policy research Institute.