Another disappointment over Siachin

The POST, Sun, May,28, 2006.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema


Once again the Indians have successfully delayed the resolution of Siachin dispute. Among the disputes that are currently confronting India and Pakistan, Siachin is perhaps the least complicated and easiest to resolve yet one finds no progress over the issue even after the 10^th meeting. This strikes rather strange that this is one issue that was almost resolved in terms of an agreement but not announced and signed in 1989. Various interpretations are in circulation explaining why the agreement was not announced.

The Siachin glacier issue heated up during the early 1980s primarily because of Indian attempts to occupy hitherto unoccupied areas of glacier. Situated at the extreme north  western edge of the Indian subcontinent and south of the Chinese border, Siachin glacier is just about two miles wide and around 74 miles long roughly covering an area of 300 square kilometers at an height ranging from 16000 to 23,000 feet. The Siachin glacier is located in an area where both the UN cease fire line and Lone of control are ill defined. Climatic hostilities of the region prevented both India and Pakistan to go for a detailed demarcation of the line.

For years the Siachin glacier was not an issue of discord between the two nations. Many reasons account for this. First, not only the area attracted many mountaineering expeditions to conquer difficult peaks in the region but all explorers sought permission from the Pakistani authorities as the published maps, both in the region as well as in the West, showed the area as part of Pakistan. The maps published in the West depicted cease fire line in the northern extremity of Kashmir as stretching eastward and ending at the Karakoram Pass. Not only these maps were never challenged by the Indian authorities but also the description of the northern extremity given by the Indian foreign minister soon after the signing of the Silma Agreement was generally in congruence with maps published in the West and was totally different than what was later published in the Indian maps of August 1984.

Second, both the Karachi Agreement of 1949 and the preamble of Pakistan-China Boundary Agreement of 1963, in many ways, clearly indicated that the control of the region was with Pakistan. Since 1947 Pakistan not only enjoyed complete administrative control of the region but it was also widely recognized by both the insiders as well as the outsiders. Third, the people inhabiting Siachin  region not only use Pakistani currency but also speak Balti language, a language of Baltistan district which is part of the Pakistan’s Northern Areas and buy almost all good from Pakistan.

Compared to the Pakistani arguments, the Indian mainly dwell upon the notion that since Maharaja of Kashmir signed the instrument of accession in favor of India and India claims that Northern areas are part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, thus the region falls within the jurisdiction of India.

Undoubtedly the origin of Siachin dispute lies in the non-demarcation of the glacier beyond the point NJ9842. The absence of clear demarcation of the line in this area caused cartographic confusion which, in turn, gave birth to many misinterpretations and misrepresentations. At the time of the signing of the Karachi Agreement, this area was left un-demarcated primarily because of the known climatic severity which was deemed to be unfit for human habitation. Even at the time of Simla Agreement it was presumed that climatic conditions were not conducive for human habitation and thus it was never subjected to any serious considerations.

While it is difficult to ascertain who started shooting first on the glacier but the available evidence clearly point finger towards the Indians. An American scholar who studied the Siachin dispute asserted that not only it was India which established permanent posts in the disputed glacier area first but also had made adequate preparation before undertaking the actual task of taking over Pakistani part of the glacier. It was in April1984 the Indian army launched ‘Operation Meghdoot’(Cloud Messenger) placing forces at the two key passes of the Saltoro Range which runs along Siachin glacier’s Western edge towards the Chinese border. The Indian stressed at the time that the move was a pre-emptive action in order to prevent what they perceived a Pakistani move. Pakistan, of course, denies this contention.

Prior to 1984, neither India nor Pakistan had any permanent presence in the glacier area but the Indian moves compelled the Pakistanis to undertake counter moves. Since then the conflict gradually escalated as both sides were engulfed in moves and counter moves. The conflict reached it peak in 1987. While both sides continued to strengthen their position, one thing became clear soon that neither side could dislodge the other. In 1985 both Rajiv Gandhi and Zia ul Haq  agreed in principle to discuss the dispute. Since then the dispute has been subjected to negotiated processes and ten meetings have already discussed the dispute.

After the 10^th meeting on Siachin on 24^th May 2006, the joint statement clearly reflected already anticipated stalemate. This is indeed very disappointing especially if viewed within context of unduly raised hopes of people. Some reports had already projected the likely signing of the agreement during expected Indian prime Minister’s Pakistan visit in July this year.  Just before the joint statement was issued the Indian Defense Minister pointed out that the main obstacle was mapping the bases and frontline.

The Indian assertion to authenticate the actual ground position line is viewed by many in Pakistan as legitimizing Indian aggression in the Siachin area. Not only India violated the Simla agreement by undertaking a uni-lateral violation of the LOC and acquired some area which was deemed to be under Pakistan’s control but are also seeking to secure legal cover to retain the area its troops forcibly occupied.

The resolution the Siachin dispute does not really require many efforts unless a calculated tactics of foot dragging is employed for delaying its resolution. Admittedly the notion of foot dragging is directly linked with the lack of desired level of political will. However the joint statement and the interviews of the involved participant point towards the existence of the will or at least the impression is generated that they want to solve it but it requires more negotiations.

Three solutions are already in circulation and they deserve to be mentioned here. First, the parties could easily decide to go back to the positions when Simla Agreement was signed. The Simla Agreement in its 4^th clause specifically stated that ‘Line of Control resulting from ceasefire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations’. It was India that altered LOC unilaterally not just once but many times including the Siachin violation in 1984.

Second, the parties could easily opt for the agreement which they reportedly agreed in 1989. The idea of redeployment of troops could again be salvaged and applied as it was agreed to be applied in 1989 agreed formula. This time they are talking about withdrawal of forces. Third approach revolves around concepts like ‘Mountain of Peace’ or ‘Peace Park’ or ‘Science Park’ which would imply that both parties withdraw their troops from the disputed region. This could provide a face saving device to both parties.

Inability of the parties to work out an agreement in the third round of Indo-Pak peace process has certainly begun to inject doses of disappointment. Many are already questioning the efficacy of negotiations. Since the beginning of the peace process the overall atmosphere has certainly and vastly improved mainly because of the introduction of the CBMs but not much progress has been registered in terms of conflict resolution which is, in turn, generating disappointing vibes.  In order to sustain the negotiation process, it is imperative that some agreement in the area of conflict resolution is soon secured.

The writer works for Islamabad Policy Research Institute.