A Good Omen

The News, Sun, July,4, 2004.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema



The successful outcome of the two day deliberations on Nuclear related issues is not only a good omen but it also facilitated the subsequent meeting of the Foreign Secretaries and enabled them to initiate a dialogue process with positive approaches. Given the significance of nuclear related issues and developments not only the international community has been continuously watching India-Pakistan talks but even the South Asians were also waiting anxiously. The positive development clearly reflects that the two countries are conscious of the inherent dangers of continuous confrontations and appear to be determined to deal with it rather constructively.

Cognizant of the continuous Indo-Pak confrontation since their birth, the concerns of international community certainly appear genuine. In terms of mutual relations the record of both India and Pakistan is not really very enviable. With this kind of record, pessimistic predictions do not seem out of order. Apprehensions about their unpredictability are too well known to be overlooked. Given the past record and developments during the last few years, concern demonstrated certainly appear to be justifiable. But what are perhaps not justifiable are the interpretations that reflect that both the Indians and the Pakistanis are not fully aware of the dangers involved.

Despite the existence of enormous complexities and internal difficulties, both India and Pakistan have demonstrated their desire to make the area safer. Both are fully cognizant of the fact that there is no winner in a nuclear confrontation and are acutely aware of the grave dangers that accompany the possession of nuclear weapons along with their career systems. Both the Indians and the Pakistanis have already started a process to introduce restraint measures. The Lahore meeting and more specifically the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that was signed on Feb.22, 1999 clearly reflected the desire to cage the nuclear monster.

The Lahore MOU of 1999 suggested many CBMs (Confidence Building Measures). Among the suggested measures, the most significant were bilateral consultations on security concepts and nuclear doctrine, advance notification of missile tests, reducing risks of unauthorized and accidental use of nuclear weapons, unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear tests, reviewing the implementation of existing CBMs, setting up of appropriate consultative mechanism to monitor and ensure effective implementation of CBMs etc.

Couple of years back this writer suggested in an IPRI Paper (2002) that in order to generate confidence it would be a useful approach if both sides agree not to deploy their missiles within the deployable range along with strict observance of de-mating of warhead and its carrier. Such measures tend to generate mutual confidence. Initially there was not much response but later one could read in between the lines gradual acceptance of the suggestion. However these suggestions have not yet been given official approval.

What the Delhi nuclear related meeting has done is to start the ball rolling in a positive direction. Not only both sides have committed to take the process forward but also demonstrated their inclination to minimize dangers linked with the acquisition of nuclear weapons.  Although the seven point communiqué included some points that were already agreed upon in Lahore MoU such as continuation of bilateral consultations on security and non-proliferations issues, the agreed clauses could be divided into three broad categories. Each of these broad categories deserves some comments.

The first category can be described as consultative and discussion orientated measures. The expression on intent to have a continuous dialogue on nuclear and security related issues indicate the determination of the two sides to maintain the much-desired continuity of dialogue. Another point that further strengthens the belief that the two sides are determined to ensure a safety net around nuclear genie revolves around the commitment to hold meetings in order to work towards the attainment of what was agreed in the Lahore MoU.

Both countries also agreed for regular working level meetings to be held among all the nuclear powers to discuss issues of common concern. This appeared to be a collective invitation to other nuclear powers to join them in a global quest for peace proposing regular meetings among the nuclear weapon states. However the other nuclear weapon states may not respond to such invitation as they may entertain the idea that responding to such an invitation may amount to recognizing India and Pakistan as the 6^th and 7^th nuclear weapons states.

But what has to be considered is the fact that the both India and Pakistan are nuclear weapon states. The notion that by denying the recognition, these states are going to be striped off their weapons, is somewhat a mistaken belief and reflective of unrealistic attitudes.  How long can they afford to be unrealistic? It is better to work together to ensure the safety of the world by undertaking collective efforts. By not recognizing the reality, the target countries do not lose anything where as other power may generate an aura of unreality.  

The second group of announced measures can be termed as communication measures. The announcement to upgrade the existing hotline between the two Director-Generals of Military Operations (DGMOs) along with the introduction of another hotline between the Foreign Secretaries is indeed a very welcome development. Not only the up-gradation of the existing hotline was somewhat badly required but the frequency also needed to be improved. Currently the existing hotline between the DGMO is activated once a week. It seems that both India and Pakistan realized that the not only the efficiency need s to be ensured but frequency must also be increased.

The suggested new hotline between the Foreign Sectaries would further facilitate the communicative network and would also make sure that the other sides gets the exact message. The communication network always works better if diversified. Besides the Foreign Secretaries are very important persons particularly in facilitating the decision making process.

The third set of announced measures include working towards concluding an agreement with technical parameters on pre-notification of flight testing of missiles and reaffirming the moratorium on conducting further nuclear explosions. However it needs to be stressed here that it was also decided to include a provision that covers the emergence and development of extra-ordinary circumstances, which threaten and jeopardize supreme national interest. In such an eventuality the clause acknowledges that the involved party may think of the change in policy.

Undoubtedly the existence of a series of agreements along with effective use of incumbent CBMs and conventions conducive to generating restraints could herald the advent of much desired nuclear restraint regime in South Asia. The rationale of restraint regimes is to minimize the dangers of deliberate, accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. In all cases the overwhelming dangers involved tend to influence the actors to inject methods or evolve a mechanism that make the use of weapon impossible on one hand and also generate confidence among the adversaries on the other.

While the measures suggested at Delhi meeting along with the commitment to work towards the implementation of the Lahore MoU tend to strengthen a network of restraining measures but to further strengthen restraint regime within South Asia would require continuous efforts and periodic public commitments by both sides. An additional measure that can facilitate restraint regime revolves around the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers as quickly as possible.