Afghan offer of talks with Taliban

Pakistan OBSERVER, Tue, Oct,02, 2007.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema
 

The initial Afghan government’s reaction to the idea of talking to Taliban was not all that enthusiastic but later the idea began to gain supporters among the government officials and the Afghan government decided to make offer to the Taliban. Since then the Afghan government has repeated its peace offer and expressed that it was ready for peace talks but would not accept preconditions demanded by the Taliban such as withdrawal of all foreign troops. ‘The Afghan government is not open to negotiations with any preconditions, we are not going to have any precondition’ said a presidential spokesman in Kabul. 

The Taliban spokesman was adamant that they were sticking to their demand. ‘Our position is very clear- the withdrawal of the foreign troops is a must, also the imposition of Islamic law and re-writing of the constitution’.  ‘As long as foreign forces are in Afghanistan, negotiations are useless’. ‘We don’t want to talk to foreigners; we want to talk to Afghans to bring peace and security. As long as the foreign forces are in present, Afghanistan will never be peaceful’. 

Recent reports indicate that even Taliban have changed their stance and has agreed to participate in the negotiation process. Earlier the Taliban spokesman consistently insisted that talk would begin only on the condition if foreign troops leave. It is a well known fact that the incumbent Karazai regime is incapable to cope with the onslaught of the Taliban alone. Without the presence of foreign troops the newly trained Afghan army may not be able to sustain Taliban pressures. 

Current statement from the Taliban sources are stressing that they have never rejected negotiation with the government. Almost all concerned including the Americans and the incumbent Karazai regime, must be evaluating the Taliban’s latest somewhat positive response. The dropping of preconditions by the Taliban has been welcomed by all concerned. Undoubtedly the issue of negotiations with Taliban is being debated among western capitals and also among the Karazai regime. 

Reaching a deal with Taliban could not only change the face of Afghanistan but could also inject the much desired stability in the region. Internally a deal means that the Pakhtoons would get deserving representation within their own country. It may also reduce the well entrenched and overwhelming influence of the Northern Alliance. However this does not imply that the influence of Northern Alliance will be totally diminished. It is assumed that the influential members of Northern Alliance would continue to serve the government and in so doing they could sow the seeds of much needed reconciliation of various Afghan factions. 

The Taliban can also be categorized into two groups; moderate and the hardcore. The war lasting over three decades has certainly taken a heavy toll and there are signs that many Taliban feel exhausted and support the peace overtures. The moderate element of Taliban certainly wishes the early advent of peace. They are conscious of the fact that if war continues, the development of Afghanistan would be put off for another generation. 

Perhaps the most difficult faction of Taliban is the hardcore group. It is difficult to detach them from Al Qaeda. The bonds and links between them are reported to be rather strong. It is indeed difficult to assess the numerical strength of the hardcore elements. Numerically if the hardcore is larger than the moderates and their links with Al Qaeda are close and strong, in such case it is difficult to see the desired advent of early negotiations. 

By and large the offer of negotiation with Taliban has been welcomed by many. Many accounts are stressing that Karazai is sincere in conducting the negotiations and bringing the moderate element of Taliban into the ongoing political process. The acceptance by Taliban could enable the incumbent government to regain control some of the Pakhtoon dominated areas. 

It is safe to assume that it took almost five years to realize that without the involvement of the Taliban the country cannot enjoy the desired peace and stability. Efforts were focused on defeating the regrouped Taliban rather than making attempts to bring Taliban into the ongoing political processes. Initially all Taliban were viewed as militant and supporters of Al Qaeda by both the Americans and their Afghan partners. This is no different than what was the American perception of Iraqi Republican Guards. Once Sadam was defeated, all of his Republican Guards were also deemed to be enemies and disbanded. 

It was only after the passage of sometime that even the Americans began to realize that not all Republican Guards were dangerous but they were just good servants of state. This policy deeply annoyed factions of the Republican Guards. Later on the realistic realization stepped in; efforts were then directed to induct them back into to regular Iraqi army. A simple glance at history clearly reveals that many invaders have initially committed such mistakes and later realized their wrong interpretation of the situation lot later than right time. 

Similarly the American officials immediately dubbed all Taliban as bad Taliban after their initial victory in Afghanistan. At the time of Taliban defeat, the American were heavily influenced by their partners (members of Northern Alliance) thinking. For obvious reasons the members of Northern Alliance were looking after their own agenda and the American somewhat went along with them. 

It was only after the passage of few years the American began to be somewhat realistic in their perception and policy pursuits. Many analysts highlighted their frustration with the lack of security, the slow pace of development, massive official corruption, and anger over continuous civilian casualties etc. These factors also helped Taliban to consolidate their support. In addition the presence of foreign troops for more than five years effectively began to change the local perception and these troops are now looked at as occupiers. 

It has been fully realized that an outright victory over Taliban is an illusive target-at least at the moment. And the firm pursuit of this target is likely to consume much more time and enormous efforts over many years. The convening of Grand Jirga and consequent formation of smaller Jirga was entrusted with the task of contacting Taliban and explore the possibilities of negotiations As mentioned above the earlier response of the Taliban was not favorable but later they also realized that negotiation is an option that should be explored. 

An impartial evaluation of the situation in Afghanistan would point toward a complicated mess with not much hope for future if the incumbent stalemate persists. The realization that Taliban should be contacted is rapidly increasing. The British Defense Minister spoke plainly at the recently held Labor Party’s annual convention and said, ‘In Afghanistan, at some stage, the Taliban will need to be involved in the peace process because they are going away any more than I suspect Hamas are going away from Palestine’. It needs to be mentioned here that Britain has more than 6000 troops in Afghanistan which are likely to increase to 7,700 by the end of the year. It would indeed be a wise approach on the part of all Afghans factions to start negotiations soon.

The writer works for Islamabad Policy research Institute.